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1 Introduction
It is commonly argued that the business cycle is likely to be amplified in economies with
imperfect financial markets. Different versions of this proposition are in [13], [1], [2], [12],
[17]. When lenders are not well informed about borrowers’ investment projects they may
devise “second-best” contracts inducing the borrowers to take desirable actions or reveal
some information. Since these contracts are often entailing collateral requirements and
credit rationing, investment and consumption turn out to be highly dependent on the
borrowers’ balance sheet position.
Most models predict that the agency costs associated to informational problems in
financial markets (monitoring costs, the degree of moral hazard and adverse selection,
etc.) are more important in recessions rather than booms. In fact, agency costs are a
decreasing function of firms’ liquidity or collateralized assets and most models predict
that these variables are highly procyclical when endogenized in a general equilibrium
framework.
One problem with this literature is that it cannot explain why booms may sometime
revert to recessions. The idea that agency costs and distortions are negatively affected
by firms’ net worth is good for explaining the amplification of business cycles (e.g., the
fact that recessions may last longer than predicted by the real business cycle models),
much less for understanding endogenous reversion mechanisms.
This paper analyzes the relation between informational asymmetries in financial mar-
kets and business cycle fluctuations from a rather different perspective. We explore the
effects of asymmetric information in financial markets by focusing on the joint effects of
adverse selection and moral hazard in a world with heterogeneous entrepreneurs and in-
vestment projects. Our goal is to generate the distribution of entrepreneurs and projects
in equilibrium and to see how this distribution evolves along the business cycle.
Projects chosen by a given pool of heterogeneous borrowers-entrepreneurs (differen-
tiated by ability or location) can be ranked in terms of risk and productivity. Some of
them are characterized by a higher probability of default and a lower expected output for
given investment. Entrepreneurs have no endowment and they can only invest by apply-
ing for loan contracts. The type of investment projects that they choose is a function of
the set of loan contracts offered by lenders with no information about borrowers’ types
and investment choices. We endogenize the distribution of projects by assuming that
loan contracts are Pareto optimal and decentralizable (i.e., they maximize the borrow-
ers’ surplus over the set of incentive compatible contracts for which lenders’ are making
non negative profits under a “no cross subsidizing condition”) and by imposing that the
opportunity cost of lending is determined by a market clearing condition in the market
for loans. Due to asymmetric information and limited liability, the social costs generated
by the risky projects are not fully internalized and some entrepreneurs may choose to
adopt them. The higher the proportion λ of entrepreneurs undertaking these projects,
the higher is the loss of efficiency and real resources characterizing competitive equilibria.
The key step in the paper is to relate the optimal contracts and the distribution of
bad projects λ to the opportunity cost of lending (the risk free interest rate) and the
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amount of loanable funds. We show that λ is an increasing function of interest payments
(loan rate times loan size) on good projects, i.e., higher interest payments and limited
liability make the moral hazard and adverse selection problems more important. A rise
in the interest rate induces a price and a quantity effect on interest payments. The price
effect increases the cost of borrowing (higher loan rate), while the quantity effect reduces
the loan size. If the quantity effect dominates over the price effect, interest payments
go down along with the proportion of bad investment projects. As the interest rate is
determined by a market-clearing condition in the market for loans, a rise in loanable
funds may have a negative effect on the loan rates and a positive effect on the average
loan size. Hence, when the quantity effect dominates over the price effect, the proportion
of bad projects λ is increasing in the size of loanable funds.
In the final section we embed this framework in an overlapping generations model
where the amount of loanable funds is equal to the competitive wage rate arising from
a neoclassical production function. This feature allows for a characterization of the
joint evolution of projects distribution and output and the evaluation of the impact of
exogenous shocks. We find that the model may produce multiple steady states and
that a rise in productivity increases the steady state values of the wage rate along with
the proportion of bad projects. In addition, when the production function is not “too
concave”, a productivity shock has a smaller impact on steady state real wages and output
in the asymmetric information than in the full information model. Finally, we show that
the evolution of equilibrium contracts along the cycle may produce discontinuities in
the relation between the amount of loanable funds and the opportunity cost of lending
that may be responsible for endogenous cycles. These cycles may exist because the high
set-up costs generated during the upswing (when more borrowers choose high risk and
wasteful projects) may eventually grow large enough to decrease output and wages.
Discontinuities are possible in our model because optimal contracts are subject to a
no cross subsidizing (NCS) condition. The latter allows for optimal contracts to be decen-
tralizable in a competitive environment. In appendix 3 we show how we can decentralize
optimal contracts as the Nash equilibrium outcome of the three stage game proposed
by Hellwig [9]. NCS may generate “regime switches”: an increase of the opportunity
cost of lending may cause a switch of equilibrium contracts from “pooling” (borrowers
get the same contract irrespective of their project selection) to “separating” (borrowers
“self-select” by choosing contracts designed for their own project) or vice versa. This is
the source for the existence of endogenous cycles.
The “cleansing effect of recessions”, a phenomenon documented by Caballero and
Hammour [6] in a different context, may be a way of describing concisely what may
happen in our economy. During the cyclical upswing (when there is a large amount of
loanable funds) competitive lenders devise contracts attracting a high proportion of bad
projects; the opposite occurs during the downswing. In other words, contrary to other
papers in this field, our model predicts that the adverse selection and moral hazard
problem in financial markets may be more severe during booms than recessions. Clearly,
the reason for these diverging results is that we focus on the equilibrium selection of
different investment projects instead of focusing on the interaction between credit limits
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and asset prices along the cycle. The two approaches are not competing with each other.
One may argue that having entrepreneurs with no endowment is a strong assumption.
In fact, the degree of moral hazard and adverse selection could be a function of the
cyclical behavior of entrepreneurs’ net worth so as to alter the dynamics of our model.
In appendix 4 we show that, when Pareto optimal contracts are obtained by maximizing
the borrowers’ surplus, the existence of positive endowments does not significantly alter
the results of the model as long as the endowment is small enough. In particular, if
the down payment earns the opportunity cost r and if there is no cost of liquidation,
borrowers’ capital does not affect the nature of pooling contracts and it may reduce the
set of economies for which equilibrium contracts are separating. Since our results hold
under much weaker conditions when contracts are pooling, introducing an endowment
may actually help in making our point.
By analyzing the optimal contracts between risk neutral borrowers and lenders in
a model with both moral hazard and adverse selection, Chan and Thakor [8] reach a
different conclusion. They show that, when lenders maximize the borrowers’ surplus,
the optimal contract involves fully collateralized loans and no rationing of either type of
borrowers. However, in Chan and Thakor’s model, collateral is a good that cannot be
used for investment and borrowers have unconstrained access to this good. When firms
have a limited amount of collateral and this is sufficiently low, credit rationing can still
arise in their model.
Relation with the existing literature
Mankiw [13] uses adverse selection to show that a rise in interest rates may lead to a
large decrease in lending and even a collapse in the loan market. This result is based
on Stiglitz and Weiss [16], where a higher loan rate may raise the probability of lending
to bad credit risks thereby increasing the extent of adverse selection. Note that the
model does not rely on the existence of credit rationing or collateral requirements. The
model can be used to show that a small increase in the (riskless) opportunity cost of
lending may have a substantial negative effect on real investment and it may lead to
a higher degree of adverse selection. However, in this model, the opportunity cost of
lending is exogenous. This is an important limitation, since the idea of a market collapse
may no longer be true in a model where the opportunity cost of lending derives from
an equilibrium condition in the loan market. In particular, one may object that, if all
borrowers were driven out of the market, there would be a fall in the rate on deposits so
as to restore market participation of at least some of the low risk borrowers. In addition,
Mankiw only considers pooling equilibria, i.e., lenders have no way to devise separating
contracts.
Our model parallels Mankiw [13] by assuming a standard adverse selection model
where liquidity and collateral have no role. However, unlike Mankiw, we endogenize
the opportunity cost of lending as an equilibrium interest rate on deposit, we allow
for separating contracts and we add a specific form of moral hazard in the lenders-
borrowers relations so as to endogenize the distribution of borrowers in terms of risk and
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productivity. Since we show that, in some cases (when the quantity effect dominates
over the price effect), the proportion of bad projects may be procyclical, our results are
at variance with Mankiw [13].
Suarez and Sussman [17] explore the possibility that the costs associated to asym-
metric information may be more important in booms than in recessions. In this paper
consumers have quasi-linear utility functions over two goods, one of which is produced
by a set of entrepreneurs. Production takes two periods and the first period output is a
deterministic indivisible amount. Because of moral hazard and limited liability contracts,
the probability of success of any given investment project is positively correlated with the
value of first period output. Since entrepreneurs face a downward sloping demand curve,
this value is anti cyclical in equilibrium. It follows that a boom generates a low price
of output and a low liquidity thereby increasing external finance. Due to moral hazard,
this leads to excessive risk taking and a high rate of failure. However, the prediction that
borrowers’ net worth is counter-cyclical is at variance with empirical regularities.
Carlstrom and Fuerst [7] study a computable general equilibrium model based on
agency costs and find that the output response to exogenous shocks is characterized by
more propagation and less amplification than in the standard Real Business Cycle model.
The agency problem derives from the costly state verification model of Townsend [18] and
contractual relations between lenders and borrowers are assumed to be anonymous. It is
shown that production of investment goods depends on two key variables: entrepreneurs’
net worth and the price of new capital goods. Because of the incentive problem, the price
of capital exceeds production cost and, abstracting from the role of agents’ net worth, the
model is almost isomorphic to a model with costs of adjusting capital. Then, a positive
shock on agents’ net worth increases the supply of new capital goods and drives down the
price of capital. Since the response of agents’ net worth to exogenous shocks is sluggish,
aggregate fluctuations may loose amplitude while gaining persistence.
2 The model
Agents and technologies
We consider an economy with overlapping generations of two sets of agents, lenders and
entrepreneurs (or borrowers). Each set has a continuum of two-period-lived identical
individuals in an interval of size one.
The cumulative distribution function of entrepreneurs is G (with density G′ = g),
where G is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable with support in [0, 1] and
such that
Assumption 1 sg′(s)/g(s) > −2, for all s ∈ [0, 1].
The precise role of the above assumption will be apparent in section 4, where we
derive the loan contracts allowing entrepreneurs to finance their projects. Essentially, the
assumption simplifies the exposition, by ruling out a non convexity of the programming
problem from which contract choices are derived.
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Lenders are endowed with one unit of labor when young, which they supply inelas-
tically to a large set of competitive firms engaged in the production of a final good y.
Entrepreneurs are endowed with the ability to run investment projects, whose output is
an intermediate good z. All agents save and produce while young and consume in old
age only. Given this assumption, it is inessential to specify the utility function of the
”old”, assumed to be strictly monotonic. Good y can be consumed or used as a capital
good for the production of z, which is an input (materials) for the production of the final
good y. Capital and materials fully depreciate in the production process. Production of
y is instantaneous and described by the following production function:
y = AF (z, L),
where A > 0 is a productivity parameter and L is a labor input.
Assumption 2 F (z, L) is homogeneous of degree 1 and strictly concave.
Under full employment and by the linear homogeneity of F (.) we can write:
y = AF (z, 1) ≡ Af(z)
where f ′(z) > 0 and f ′′(z) < 0.
Prices are defined in units of the final good and we let w and q be the relative prices
of labor and materials respectively. Then, perfect competition and profit maximization
imply:
w = A
[
f(z)− zf ′(z)
]
≡ AW (z), q = Af ′(z) (1)
An entrepreneur s ∈ [0, 1] can undertake, in the first period, one of two possible
projects, L and H. These are production processes taking one period to be completed.
Projects are perfectly divisible and they require a set-up cost. In particular, if entrepre-
neur s invests k at time t − 1 in the j-project (j = H,L), ejs units are used to pay the
set-up cost, while the remaining amount yields a random output at time t according to
the following simple technology1:
z˜js(k) = max{0, α˜j(k − ejs)}.
This technology satisfies the following assumptions.
Assumption 3 α˜j is iid across entrepreneurs and it takes two values, αj > 0 with
probability pj and zero with probability 1− pj. Moreover,
pH < pL, pLαL = pHαH = α¯.
1No qualitative property of our model depends on the fact that the set-up cost is proportional to the
marginal product of capital α˜j .
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Assumption 4 z˜js(k) = z˜js(1) for all k ≥ 1.
Assumption 5 eLs = 0, eHs = es, with e > 0.
Both project types are affected by two parameter values: the marginal products αj
and the set-up cost ejs. Since the latter is a function of j (the riskiness of the project)
and s (the entrepreneur’s ability), the model is characterized by both moral hazard and
adverse selection.
Assumption 3 is almost a replica of a key assumption in Stiglitz and Weiss [16], i.e.,
projects differ according to a mean preserving spread of the marginal rates of return.
The alternative assumption pLαL > pHαH would not change the basic predictions of our
model, as long as the two expected marginal products are not too far apart.
Assumption 4 guarantees the existence of solutions to the entrepreneurs’ profit max-
imization problem for a wide range of relative prices.
Assumption 5, together with 3, imply that any investment k yields a higher expected
output with L-projects than with H-projects. For this reason we will occasionally refer
to the H-project as the “bad” project.
Assumptions 4, 3 and 5 generalize the standard adverse selection model (e.g., Stiglitz
and Weiss [16], Bester [3], Boyd and Smith [5]) introducing a potential moral hazard
problem in the relation between entrepreneurs and outside investors. In a pure adverse
selection model projects are not choice variables, the output of a project is independent
of s and, in general, of k, since investment is usually assumed to be indivisible.
We consider the above assumptions to be the natural generalization of the standard
assumptions employed in the literature on adverse selection to a setting including moral
hazard (however, see Bester [4] for a different approach).
The assumptions about the production of materials is where we depart from more
standard models. Here we choose a simple condition to capture the idea that only the
”best” entrepreneurs (low values of s) find the risky project more profitable than the safe
project. While in Stiglitz and Weiss [16] the risky project yields, by the mean preserving
spread assumption, a higher expected profit, in our model this is true only for the best
entrepreneurs. This creates an incentive for some borrowers to select the safe project.
The reference to a set-up cost is just a way, computationally convenient, to obtain this
property.
Loan contracts and information structure
The type of an entrepreneur and his investment choice are private information, both
before and after the realization of the random variable α˜j . However, it is publicly known
whether an investment project is successful or not, i.e., whether α˜j = 0 or α˜j > 0.
Since entrepreneurs have no physical endowment and projects yield no output in
the bad state, the entire production of the intermediate good is financed externally
with limited liability loan contracts. Namely, the borrower repays the loan when the
investment project is successful, while no payment occurs otherwise.
7
As in many other applications of incentive problems to the analysis of business cycles
(e.g., Bernanke and Gertler [1], [2], Suarez and Sussman [17]), we assume that loan
contracts are constrained Pareto Optimal, i.e., they are the best arrangement under which
borrowing can take place, given the information structure. More precisely, contracts
are obtained by maximizing the borrowers’ profit subject to the lenders’ participation
constraint. Since lenders are only consuming when old, their reservation utility at time
t is rtqtwt−1, where r is a deterministic “opportunity cost of lending” in units of the
intermediate good. When deriving contracts, we take r as given. However, this is
an endogenous variable, which is determined, at equilibrium, by the equality between
demand and supply of loanable funds. We will see that, to avoid trivial cases, r can be
restricted in the interval [0, α¯] since, for r outside this interval, no lending takes place.
A contract is a pair c = (B,R) specifying the size of the loan and the amount of
repayment per unit of loan in the good state. For convenience, the loan size, B, is
defined in units of the final good and the amount of repayment per unit of loan, R, is
defined in units of the intermediate good. This specification of c allows us to define the
expected profit of an entrepreneur in units of the intermediate good independently of q.
In particular, the expected profit at time t of an entrepreneur s investing at time t − 1
in the j-project with a contract ct−1 = (Bt−1, Rt) signed at time t− 1 is:
pijs,t(ct−1) = (α¯− pjRt)Bt−1 − α¯ejs, j = H,L,
where eH = e and eL = 0.
The presence of asymmetric information rules out contracts contingent on the specific
realizations of α˜j , the borrowers’ type and their project choice. In principle, lenders may
devise a continuum of contracts, each of them inducing self selection of s-types. However,
in our model, for a given project choice, the borrower’s ranking of the available contracts
is independent of the type s. More precisely, if c and c′ are two distinct contracts,
pijs(c)− pijs(c
′) is s- independent for j = L,H. Therefore, there is no loss of generality in
restricting our attention to at most two contracts (designed for each project). We call
these separating if they are distinct, and pooling if they are equal.
Let C (r) be the family of optimal contracts for a given (next period) opportunity
cost of lending r. An element c ∈ C (r) is a pair cs = (cH , cL) (if contracts are sepa-
rating) or it is a single contract cp (if contracts are pooling), with cj = (Rj , Bj) and
j = H,L, p. Separating contracts induce self selection of borrowers. Thus, a borrower
adopting the risky (safe) project (weakly) prefers cH to cL (cL to cH). Equivalently, sep-
arating contracts satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints, i.e., , piLs (cL) ≥ piLs (cH)
and piHs (cH) ≥ piHs (cL).
Whether c is separating or pooling depends on which of these alternative arrange-
ments provides the largest surplus. Whenever pooling and separating contracts yield
the same surplus, we allow for randomization. Namely, a random contract is an array
c = (cs, cp, θ) with θ ∈ [0, 1] denoting the probability for the lender to get the separating
contract. With random contracts, the lender selects the investment project after having
observed the realization of the lottery over the pair (cs, cp). If the separating contract
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realizes, the lender is free to choose the cH or cL component. By construction, random-
ization does not alter the optimal surplus. However, it is essential for the existence of
an equilibrium in the market of loanable funds (see next section). Thus, the optimal
contract c(r) is separating (pooling) if θ(r) = 1 (θ(r) = 0). The precise definition of the
Planner’s problem and the derivation of the optimal contracts is described in appendix
1.
Intertemporal equilibria
To simplify the exposition, we now define intertemporal equilibria when contracts are
deterministic. However, as already mentioned, existence of an equilibrium may require a
randomization. Later on in this section, we explain how to generalize the definition and
the analysis to random contracts.
For given opportunity cost of lending, rt, a set of optimal contracts, C(rt), and a
proportion of entrepreneurs selecting the H-project, λ(rt), are determined at t− 1. The
aggregate demand for loans at time t− 1 is denoted as D(rt), where
D(r) =
(
1−G(λκ(r)(r))
)
BL(κ(r))(r) +G(λκ(r)(r))BH(κ(r))(r),
where κ(r) = p if cp(r) = C(r), κ(r) = s if cs(r) = C(r), L(p) = H(p) = p, L(s) = L
and H(s) = H. Hence,
D(r) =
{
Bp(r) if κ(r) = p,
(1−G(λs(r))BL(r) +G(λs(r))BH(r) if κ(r) = s.
Since lenders work in young age and consume when old, the (per capita) supply of
funds at time t− 1 coincides with the wage rate wt−1 and the market clearing condition
in the loan market at time t− 1 is:
wt−1 = D(rt) (2)
The set r(wt−1) of values of r solving equation 2 is defined as the set of temporary
equilibrium interest rates. By the law of large numbers (with the usual caveat applying to
a continuum of random variables (see Judd [11]) and by the assumption that borrowers
get all the surplus generated by the optimal contracts, lenders earn the deterministic
gross return r on any unit of loaned funds. Hence, their (per capita) consumption at
t is simply rtqtwt−1. Since pHαH = pLαL = α¯, the supply of the intermediate good is
defined by:
Z(r) = α¯
(∫ λκ(r)
0
(BH(κ)(r)− es)dG(s) +
∫ 1
λκ(r)
BL(κ)(r)dG(s)
)
.
Hence, Z(r) = α¯D(r)−Me(r), where:
Me(r) = α¯
∫ λκ(r)
0
esdG(s)
9
is the aggregate set-up cost. The market clearing conditions in the labor and material
markets are determined by Equations 1 (i.e., wt = AW (zt) and qt = Af ′(zt)) and the
equality between demand, zt, and supply, Z(rt), of the intermediate good at time t:
zt = Z(rt) = α¯D(rt)−MeA(rt). (3)
At a general equilibrium, the markets for loanable funds, labor, final and intermediate
goods clear. The equilibrium conditions determine three relative prices: the interest rates
r (in units of the intermediate good), the wage rate w and the price of the intermediate
good q. Exploiting Walras’ Law, we eliminate the market clearing condition for the final
good.
Definition 1 (Intertemporal equilibrium) For given initial value w0, an intertem-
poral equilibrium is a trajectory {(zt, wt−1, rt, qt, C(rt)) : t ≥ 1}, such that, for all t, C(rt)
is a family of optimal contracts and equations 1, 2 and 3 are satisfied.
Definition 2 (Stationary state) A stationary state is an array (z∗e , w∗e , r∗e) such that
w∗e = D(r∗e) = AW (α¯w∗e −Me(r∗e)) , z∗e = Z(r∗e), q∗e = Af
′(z∗e ).
By trivial manipulations, we can more directly define an intertemporal equilibrium
as a sequence {(wt, rt) : t ≥ 1} satisfying equation 2 and:
wt = AW (α¯wt−1 −Me(rt)) , (4)
where the remaining variables, zt and qt are determined by the conditions zt = Zj(rt)
and qt = Af
′(zt).
Evidently, for e = 0 (i.e., when all entrepreneurs are equal), the dynamic behavior of
the real wage (and therefore, of materials and final output) is independent of the loan
market. Intertemporal equilibria can be derived from:
wt = AW (α¯wt−1). (5)
In the next section we show that the above also characterizes intertemporal equilibria
of the full information model.
Full information
When projects are observable, optimal contracts are contingent on project types. By
limited liability, these contracts are a pair (cL, cH) such that pLRL = pHRH = r and:
BL = BH = 1 if Rj < αj ,
Bj ∈ [0, 1] if Rj = αj , j = H,L.
For w < 1, equilibrium in the market for loans implies Bj = w, Rj = αj , j = H,L.
Then, all borrowers choose the L-project and the opportunity cost of lending is rt = α¯
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for all t. An intertemporal equilibrium of the full information model is, therefore, the
unique monotonic sequence {wt : t ≥ 1} solving equation 5 with initial condition w0 < 1.
To single out the role of informational asymmetries in the dynamics of the model, we
only consider economies that, under full information, have stationary states w∗0 ∈ (0, 1].
The following assumption guarantees this:
Assumption 6 limz→0−zAf ′′(z) > 1/α¯, Af(α¯)− α¯Af ′(α¯) ≤ 1.
Competitive allocations of the benchmark model are Pareto optimal if and only if
they are dynamically efficient. As usual, we define a stationary intertemporal equilib-
rium as dynamically efficient if there is no way to increase agents’ total consumption by
destroying the existing stock of capital. This type of inefficiency (which typically arises
in overlapping generation models) is ruled out when the marginal product of capital is
sufficiently high. The relevant condition in this model is α¯Af ′(α¯w∗0) ≥ 1.
3 Intertemporal Equilibria with asymmetric information
In this section we partially characterize the dynamic properties of competitive equilibria
with asymmetric information. We first provide an informal discussion of the contractual
problem and we state the main properties of the optimal contracts. Then, we examine the
consequences of these properties on intertemporal equilibria, under a set of simplifying
assumptions. These are the minimum set of assumptions guaranteeing the uniqueness
of a temporary equilibrium interest rate r (and optimal random contract) for any given
wage w. It will be explained in a moment that uniqueness can be insured whenever
the set-up cost e is not “too small” (the critical size of e depends on the shape of the
distribution functionG(s)). Furthermore, we will show that, when e is big enough so as to
guarantee the uniqueness of an equilibrium interest rate, r(w), the latter is a decreasing
function and the associated proportion of bad projects, λ(r(w)), is an increasing function
of w. We regard this as the “regular case” when the inefficiency arising from asymmetric
information is quantitatively significant.
The existence of a unique temporary equilibrium interest rate, r(w), has important
implications for the dynamics of intertemporal equilibria. Indeed, when r(w) is decreas-
ing and λ(r(w)) is increasing in w, the aggregate set-up cost
Me(r(w)) = α¯
∫ λ(r(w))
0
esdG(s) ≡ me(w)
is an increasing function of w. Then, equation 4 becomes:
wt = AW (α¯wt−1 −me(wt−1)) .
A detailed analysis of the dynamics of the above map will be derived later on in this
section. However, it is immediate to see that the positive effect of an increase in past
wages wt−1 on current wage wt is tempered by the rise of the aggregate set-up cost.
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Hence, adverse selection and moral hazard imply a slower wage growth and a smaller
impact of exogenous shocks as compared to the full information case.
When these assumptions are not satisfied, optimal contracts may not be unique and
intertemporal equilibria may display a variety of different dynamic patterns. In the
final section of the paper we concentrate on a specific type of multiplicity related to the
coexistence of different type of optimal contracts (pooling and separating) for a given
wage. This multiplicity calls for a selection criterion and it may be responsible for the
existence of endogenous fluctuations. We postpone the discussion of these cases to the
last section of the paper, after the complete characterization has been provided. The
example shows that, for e below the value over which uniqueness is guaranteed, the
model does not always behave (not even approximately) like the full information model.
The reason is that optimal contracts may “switch” from separating (pooling) to pooling
(separating) as w changes along the cycle and ”switching regimes” are associated to
discontinuities of the map defining the equilibrium dynamics.
Main properties of loan contracts
Contracts are obtained by maximizing the borrowers’ profit subject to the lenders’ par-
ticipation constraint. The presence of a continuum of borrowers’ types allows for many
possible and alternative choices of the Planner’s objective function. The propositions,
in this section, state some of the most relevant properties of the optimal contracts. The
analysis of the contractual problem together with the proof of all the propositions in
this section are in Appendix 1. Although we provide some intuition for the results,
the propositions that follow can be read, at this stage, as assumptions satisfied by the
optimal contracts.
As it is customary in environments with asymmetric information, we design the con-
tractual problem by imposing a no cross subsidizing (NCS) condition. More specifically,
we require that (separating) contracts (cL, cH) cannot produce a negative surplus for
the lender when offered separately2. The (NCS) condition guarantees that optimal con-
tracts are decentralizable in a competitive environment. In appendix 3 we provide a
specific game form, with lenders (banks) and borrowers, which delivers (decentralizes)
as a (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium the efficient contracts used in the paper. As
usual, the decentralization of efficient contracts requires an exclusivity assumption, i.e.,
each borrower can apply at most for one contract.
By the NCS condition, optimal contracts may be either pooling or separating (or
both), depending on the value of r. A value r∗ ∈ (0, α¯) is called a switching point if
cp and cs are both in C(r∗) (are both optimal). r∗ is called a switching point because,
as shown in appendix 1 (lemma 4), for e in a generic set of R++, r∗ is locally isolated
and optimal contracts “switch” from pooling (separating) to separating (pooling) as r
crosses r∗. The (generically finite and possibly empty) set of switching points in [0, α¯]
is denoted with S∗. From now on we will implicitly assume that e is either zero or it
belongs to the generic subset of R++ for which S∗ is finite.
2See Henriet and Rochet [10] for a discussion of the role of the NCS condition in competitive markets.
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Proposition 1 For all r ∈ [0, α¯], the set of optimal contracts C(r) is non empty. More-
over,
• C(r) is unique whenever r ∈ [0, α¯]\S∗ (i.e., whenever θ(r) equals 0 or 1);
• if S∗ = ∅, θ(r) = 0 (i.e., the optimal contract is pooling) for all r ∈ [0, α¯] and if
S∗ 6= ∅, θ(r) = 0 for all r ∈ [0, r∗1) and some r∗1 ∈ S∗;
• the optimal proportion of H-projects, λ(r), is strictly positive for all r ∈ (0, α¯) and
λ(0) = λ(α¯) = 0.
Proposition 1 guarantees that the set {r : θ(r) = 0} is non empty, i.e., a deterministic
pooling contract is optimal for r small enough. The proposition, however, does not
rule out θ(r′) = 1 for some r′ ∈ (0, α¯), i.e., the possibility for optimal contracts to be
separating. Clearly, if θ(r′) = 1 for some r′ ∈ (0, α¯), proposition 1 implies that S∗ 6= ∅.
In the pure adverse selection model, if cross subsidization is allowed, Pareto optimal
contracts are always separating. The loan contract offered to high risk borrowers is
associated with a higher loan rate and it generates a surplus which can be used to
subsidize the contract (generating a negative surplus) offered to low risk borrowers. The
NCS condition imposes a lower bound on the loan rate of the (safe) L-contract. Thus,
the benefit from cream skimming may not be fully exploitable and a pooling contract
may dominate. This is a known possibility in pure adverse selection environments with
exogenously given values of risky projects λ (e.g., Rotschild and Stiglitz [15]). In our
economy, instead, the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection makes λ endogenous
and thus, separating and pooling contracts may be optimal for different values of r (or
for the same r). Proposition 1 shows that “cream skimming” is not beneficial when the
opportunity cost of lending is relatively low.
The following two propositions provide two alternative sufficient conditions under
which switching points are either absent or unique.
Proposition 2 Let S∗ 6= ∅. Then, r∗1 is increasing in e. Moreover, there is a value eo
large enough and such that, for e ≥ eo, S∗ = ∅.
Proposition 3 If sg(s)/G(s) ≤ 1, S∗ is either empty or it contains a unique switching
point r∗ ∈ (0, α¯).
Proposition 3 shows that, for a large class of distributions functions, either optimal
contracts are pooling for all r, or they are pooling for r < r∗1 ∈ (0, α¯). A specific case is
the uniform distribution, i.e., G(s) = s, for which the unique switching point is:
r∗ = α¯µ+ 4(1 − µ)2/e .
In this case, optimal contracts are always pooling if e ≥ 4(1−µ) and they are separating
for r ∈ [r∗, α¯] otherwise.
The general equilibrium properties of the model are critically related to the behavior
of the optimal contracts as a function of r. The next propositions characterize the map
C(r) when θ(r) = 0 or θ(r) = 1 (deterministic contracts).
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Proposition 4 Consider a deterministic contract cκ(r) ∈ C(r) (κ = p, s). Then, Bκ(r)
is non increasing and Rκ(r) is strictly increasing for all r ∈ [0, α¯]. Moreover, BH(r) =
1 > BL(r) and Bp(r) < 1 for all r ∈ (ro, α¯], for some ro ∈ (0, α¯).
Proposition 4 is in line with known results in the adverse selection literature. Asym-
metric information may generate credit rationing of all borrowers when contracts are
pooling and credit rationing of the safe borrowers (those selecting project L) when con-
tracts are separating. Since contracts guarantee the lenders a reservation utility defined
by the opportunity cost r, a higher value of r is compensated by a higher repayment Rκ.
Since high repayments induce borrowers to take more risk, the Planner reduces the loan
size to compensate for the loss generated by the increase in risk.
Separating contracts (cH , cL) satisfy two conditions. The first is the no cross subsi-
dizing (NCS) condition pLRL = pHRH = r. The second states, as in the pure adverse
selection model (e.g., Rotschild and Stiglitz [15]), that the risky borrowers are not ra-
tioned, i.e., BH = 1, and that they are indifferent between the cH and the cL , contract,
i.e., piHs (cH) = piHs (cL). When the NCS condition is taken into account, the latter implies
that:
BL =
(
α¯− pLRL
α¯− pHRL
)
.
Rationing of safe borrowers is the cost paid in order to make a separating contract
incentive compatible (cream skimming). By optimality, BL must be the largest loan size
satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint of the risky borrower.
The proportion of risky (bad) projects λ plays a fundamental role in a general equilib-
rium. When r 6∈ S∗, this variable will be denoted with λκ(r), where κ = p if C(r) = cp(r)
and κ = s if C(r) = cs(r).
Proposition 5 The functions λj(r) (j = s, p) are continuous and unimodal in [0, α¯]
(with λj(0) = λj(α¯) = 0). Furthermore, λp(r) is strictly decreasing in r, for r ∈ (ro, α¯].
Finally, if λ ∈ (0, 1), it is:
λκ = (p
L − pH)
α¯e R
L(κ)(r)BL(κ)(r),
for κ = p, s and L(p) = p, L(s) = L.
The particular functional form of λκ in proposition 5 is immediately obtained by
solving for λ the equation piHs (cp) = piL(cp), when contracts are pooling, and the equation
piHλ (cH) = piL(cL), when they are separating.
For r ∈ S∗, optimal contracts are a correspondence and the expression of λ depends
on the particular contracts Cθ(r) selected. Hence, for r ∈ S∗ and θ ∈ (0, 1), the law of
large numbers implies that:
λ = λθ(r) = (1− θ)λp(r) + θλs(r).
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The basic content of proposition 5 is in the characterization of the proportion of
risky projects as a function of r. The statement is quite intuitive. Limited liability debt
contracts induce borrowers to undertake risky projects because of the lower expected
interest payments associated with these choices. Hence, an increase in r has an ambiguous
effect on the proportion of risky projects. This effect can be decomposed into a quantity
(fall in loan size) and a price (rise in repayments per unit of loan) effect. This is the
reason why, as stated in proposition 5, λκ(r) is increasing for low values of r (dominating
price effect) and decreasing for high values of r (dominating quantity effect).
Dynamics of equilibrium allocations
Two distinct problems arise in the model with asymmetric information. First, the set
of equilibrium interest rates r(w) defined by equation 2 may be empty, i.e., an equilib-
rium with deterministic contracts may fail to exists. Second, r(w) may contain several
elements, i.e., the pairs (wt, rt) solving equations 2 and 4, for some given value of wt−1,
may be indeterminate.
Recall that the aggregate demands of loans are
(1−G(λs(r))BL(r) +G(λs(r))BH(r) ≡ Bs(r) if θ(r) = 1,
Bp(r) if θ(r) = 0.
Then, given w ∈ [0, 1], a credit market equilibrium with random contracts is a pair
(r, ϑ), such that:
ϑBs(r) + (1− ϑ)Bp(r) = w; ϑ ∈ θ(r) (6)
and ϑ = θ(r) if r ∈ [0, α¯]\S∗, while ϑ ∈ [0, 1] otherwise. With some abuse of notation,
we keep denoting with r(w) the non empty set of values of r solving equation 6.
When S∗ 6= ∅, a temporary equilibrium with deterministic contracts may not exists
for some values of w, i.e., r(w) may be empty. The reason is simple. Consider an
arbitrarily small interval around r∗, I(r∗). By definition of switching point, for r ∈ I(r∗),
r < r∗, optimal contracts are pooling (separating), while for r ∈ I(r∗), r > r∗, optimal
contracts are separating (pooling). Thus, at r∗, the demand of loanable funds changes
discontinuously from Bp(r∗) to Bs(r∗).
When market clearing requires random contracts, i.e., when r(w) ∈ S∗, ϑ(w) will
denote the market clearing mixing parameter. Moreover, for κ = p, s, we denote with
rκ(w) the set of solutions to Bj(r) = w and, for r∗i ∈ S∗, wκi = Bj(r∗i ).
Proposition 6 For all w ∈ [0, 1], there exists a credit market equilibrium (ϑ(w), r(w)) ≥
0, with r(0) = α¯ and r(1) = 0. Moreover, if S∗ 6= ∅, wpi > wsi for all r∗i ∈ S∗ and, if
ϑ(w) ∈ (0, 1),
ϑ(w) = w
p
i − w
wpi −wsi
∈ (0, 1).
15
The proof of the above proposition can be found in Appendix 2.
By proposition 4, Bp(r) is non increasing and, then, the set of solutions to the above
equation, rp(w), is either a singleton or empty. Hence, by proposition 1, S∗ = ∅ is a
sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium interest rate r(w) = rp(w).
On the other hand, Bs(r) may be a non monotone function. In fact, notice that
∂Bs
∂r = (1−G(λ
s))
∂BL
∂r +G(λ)
∂BH
∂r + (B
H −BL)G′(λs)∂λ
s
∂r .
By proposition 4, ∂Bj/∂r ≤ 0, for j = H,L, and BH > BL. However, by claim 5,
∂λs/∂r cannot be signed and, hence, Bs(r) may not be monotonic. Hence, rs(w) may be
a non trivial correspondence. This problem can only arise when λs(r) is increasing. In
this case, a rise in the opportunity cost of lending has two effects on the aggregate demand
for loans. On the one hand, Bs(r) falls for given λ because borrowers get a smaller loan
size. On the other hand, Bs(r) rises because the proportion of risky borrowers increases
and these are the borrowers who get a larger loan size when contracts are separating.
Hence, when S∗ 6= ∅, r(w) may be a correspondence.
Avoiding multiplicity
Proposition 6 leaves open the possibility of multiple credit market equilibria and clarifies
that multiplicity may occur under the following two distinct possibilities:
(b) rs(w) is a non empty set with at least two distinct elements, r and r′, such that
θ(r) = θ(r′) = 1;
(a) θ(rp(w)) = 0 and θ(rs(w)) = 1 (and/or, θ(r(w)) ∈ (0, 1)).
Case (a) never arises when the set-up cost e is large enough. In particular, let
As(e) = {r : θ(r) = 1}. Then, we can state the following.
Proposition 7 There is a large enough value eˆ such that, for all e ≥ eˆ, λs(r) is a
decreasing function in As(e) and rs(w) ∩As(e) is decreasing in w.
Proof. In the previous section we have shown that
λs(r) = (p
L − pH)
α¯e
RLBL, BL = α¯− p
LRL
α¯− pHRL
, RL = r/pL.
By direct computations, ∂λs(r′)/∂r < 0 for r > r˜(µ) = α¯µ
(
1− (1− µ)1/2
)
. Moreover,
by proposition 2, the first switching point r∗1 is a strictly increasing function of e. Hence,
there exists eˆ such that, for e ≥ eˆ, r∗1(e) ≥ r˜(µ). By the definition of the map Bs(.) and
by the implicit function theorem, ∂λs(r′)/∂r < 0 implies ∂Bs(r′)/∂r < 0. Then, since
As(e) ⊂ [r∗1(e), α¯], ∂Bs(r′)/∂r < 0 for r ∈ As(e), e ≥ eˆ. The latter and the definition of
market clearing imply the thesis. Q.E.D.
In turn, case (b) never arises when the number of switching points is not greater
than 1 and rs(w) ∩ As(e) is decreasing in w. In particular, we can state the following
proposition.
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Proposition 8 Assume that rs(w) ∩ As(e) is a decreasing function and S∗ contains at
most one switching point. Then, r(w) is unique for all w ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. If S∗ = ∅, the proposition is trivial. Hence, suppose that S∗ = {r∗}. By
proposition 1, optimal contracts are pooling for r ∈ [0, r∗) and separating for r ∈ (r∗, α¯).
By proposition 6, wp > ws, for wκ = Bκ(r∗) and κ = s, p. Hence, for w ∈ [0, ws)∪(wp, 1],
the optimal contracts are deterministic and r(w) = rp(w) for w ∈ (Bp(r∗), 1], r(w) =
rs(w) for w ∈ [0, Bs(r∗)), while r(w) = r∗ for w ∈ [Bs(r∗), Bp(r∗)]
Consider w ∈ (ws, wp). Evidently, the random contract cθ(w) = (cs(r∗), cp(r∗), θw) is
optimal for all θw ∈ [0, 1] and it clears the credit market for ϑw = (w − wp1)/(w
p
1 − ws1).
Thus, it remains to show that there does not exists any other deterministic optimal
contract clearing the market for w ∈ (ws, wp). This follows immediately from the fact
that rs(w) ∩ As(e) is, under the stated assumption, unique and decreasing. Hence,
rs(w) < r∗ and rp(w) > r∗ for w ∈ (ws, wp). However, for r < r∗, optimal contracts are
pooling, while, for r > r∗, they are separating. Q.E.D.
Recall that there exists a value eo > 0 such that S∗ = ∅ for all e ≥ eo (cf. proposition
2) and that, if sg(s)/G(s) ≤ 1, S∗ contains a single switching point r∗ (cf. proposition
3). In either one of these cases (by proposition 8) we can rule out any multiplicity
arising from the coexistence of separating and pooling contracts for a given w. Hence,
multiplicity may only arise from the non monotonicity of Bs(r). By proposition 7, we
can state the following proposition, almost as a corollary of propositions 6, 7 and 8.
Proposition 9 If sg(s)/G(s) ≤ 1 for all s ∈ [0, 1], there exists a value e¯ > min{eo, eˆ} >
0 such that r(w) is a decreasing differentiable function and λϑ(w)(r(w)) an increasing
differentiable function of w.
Proof. By the assumptions, S∗ is either empty or it contains a unique point r∗. If
ϑ(w) = 0, λϑ(w)(r(w)) = λp(rp(w)) and, hence, it is an increasing function of w (just
recall that λp(r) is decreasing and rp(w) is decreasing in w). If ϑ(w) = 1, λϑ(w)(r(w)) =
λs(rs(w)) where, by the assumption e ≥ eˆ and proposition 7, λs(r) is decreasing and
rs(w) is decreasing. It follows that λϑ(w)(r(w)) is again an increasing function of w.
Now let ϑ(w) ∈ (0, 1), r(w) = r∗, then, by the law of large number and proposition 6,
we have
λ = λϑ(w)(r(w)) = λp(r∗)− ϑ(w) (λp(r∗)− λs(r∗)) , (7)
where ϑ(w) is the linearly decreasing function defined in proposition 6.
Now we can show that, if S∗ 6= ∅, λp(r∗) > λs(r∗). In fact, by the definition of
switching point:
r∗ = pLRp(r∗)[1 − (1− µ)G(λp(r∗))] = pLRL(r∗).
Then, Rp(r∗) > RL(r∗). Using again the definition of a switching point:
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piL(cL(r∗) = (α¯− r∗)BL(r∗) = piL(cp(r∗) = (α¯− pLRp(r∗))Bp(r∗).
Hence, Rp(r∗) > RL(r∗) implies Bp(r∗) > BL(r∗) and the proposition follows. Q.E.D.
Intertemporal equilibria when r(w) is unique.
The analysis of the dynamic behavior of the economy is carried out by imposing unique-
ness of credit market equilibria. At the end of the paper, we will discuss what conse-
quences may derive from the existence of discontinuous regime switches (i.e., discontinu-
ities in the relation between w and the equilibrium opportunity cost r(w)).
From now on in this section we study economies that satisfy the assumption of propo-
sition 9, i.e.,
Assumption 7 e ≥ e¯ > 0, sg(s)/G(s) ≤ 1 for all s ∈ [0, 1].
By proposition 9, we can express the aggregate set-up cost,Me(r(w)) as an increasing
function of w ∈ [0, 1] denoted by me(w). Thus, substituting equation 2 into equation 4,
the equilibrium dynamics of the wage rate wt is defined by the following equation:
wt = Φe(wt−1) ≡ AW (α¯wt−1 − α¯me(wt−1)) , (8)
The equilibrium sequence of wage rates is generated by equation 8 provided that
wt ≤ 1, for all t (otherwise, the capacity constraint of the intermediate good technology
is binding and Φe no longer describes the equilibrium of the system). This is an immediate
consequence of the next proposition, which is proved in appendix 2.
Proposition 10 Under assumption 7:
• Φe(w) is increasing in [0, 1];
• Φe(w) has at least one fixed point w∗e in [0, 1) such that Φ
′
e(w∗e) < 1;
• w∗e < w∗0.
By proposition 10, all the stationary states of the asymmetric information economy
are smaller than w∗0, the stationary state of the benchmark model. Furthermore, Φe(w)
is increasing in [0, 1], it has at least one fixed point w∗e ∈ [0, 1) with Φ′e(w∗e) < 1, and
since Φ0(w) > Φe(w), by assumption 6, 1 > Φe(1). Hence, for any given initial condition
w¯ ∈ (0, 1), the equilibrium sequence of wage rates converges monotonically to some
steady state w∗e < w∗0. Hence, for any initial condition in (0, 1), the equilibrium sequence
of wage rates {wt} is bounded above by 1.
Evidently, since there are no more restrictions on the shape of the map Φe(w) other
than the ones specified in proposition 10, we cannot rule out the existence of multiple
18
fixed point. In this case, the equilibrium sequence may converge to different steady states
for different initial conditions and asymmetric information may be responsible for the
existence of “poverty traps” that would otherwise be absent in the model.
Since λ is an increasing function of w, the monotonicity of the sequence of equilibrium
wages translates into monotonicity of the equilibrium proportion of bad projects. Figure
1 shows a diagrammatic representation of the equilibrium dynamics of the model with
full and asymmetric information.
By inspection of the map Φe, a rise in w generates two opposite effects. On one hand,
higher wages increase the amount of loanable funds, the production of materials, and,
hence, of the marginal productivity of labor. The latter reinforces the initial increase in
wages. This is the only mechanism at work in the benchmark model when initial wages
fall short of their steady state value. However, in the asymmetric information model,
higher wages produce a fall in the opportunity cost of lending and, hence, an increase
in the proportion of bad projects and, as a consequence of the latter, an increase in the
amount of resources lost as set-up cost. This is the novel mechanism at work. If the effect
of w on λ is positive and strong, this mechanism damps business fluctuations (relatively
to the full information benchmark), thereby introducing a role for asymmetric informa-
tion somewhat in contrast with the standard view in this literature. Most importantly,
this phenomenon may occur (locally around a steady state) irrespectively of whether
the equilibrium contracts are separating or pooling3. Finally, the same mechanism is
responsible for the (possible) existence of multiple steady states.
To evaluate the long-run effect of a productivity shock with asymmetric information,
consider a stable steady state w∗e and define the elasticity of a change in A as:
(e) = ∂w
∗
e/∂A
w∗e/A
=
1
1− Φ′e(w∗e)
where
Φ
′
e(w∗e) = AW ′(.)α¯
[
1− eλg(λ) ∂λ∂w
]
and (e) is well defined and positive by the stability of w∗e . Hence, a stable steady state
λ∗e is increasing in the productivity parameter A. Furthermore, since Φ′e(w∗e) defines
the approximate “speed of adjustment” to the steady state wage rate, (e) is positively
correlated with the speed of adjustment of real wages to their steady state value.
We can compare the steady state effects of a productivity shock in the asymmetric
information model relative to the full information case by looking at the values of (e)
and (0). The results are summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 11 (e) < (0) for e > 0 iff:
3Although we do not investigate this issue, we conjecture that the phenomenon holds independently
of the no-cross subsidizing condition. In the absence of this condition, optimal contracts would always
be separating, but a positive relation between w and λ may still be there.
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eλg(λ) ∂λ
∂w
> 1− W
′ (α¯w∗0)
W ′ (α¯w∗e − α¯me(w∗e))
. (9)
where λ and ∂λ/∂w are computed at r(w∗e).
Proposition 11 states that, if inequality 9 is satisfied, a productivity shock has a
relatively smaller impact on steady state real wages and output in the asymmetric infor-
mation than in the full information model. How should we interpret these results? The
right hand side of the inequality in proposition 11 is non positive for all convex wage
functions W (.). In these cases the inequality is always verified. When the wage function
is strictly concave, (e) < (0) requires a sufficiently high value of ∂λ/∂w at w∗e . In the
latter case, the speed of adjustment with e > 0 tends to be smaller because of adverse
selection (i.e., the adverse effect of λ on output), but it tends to be higher because of
concavity (the steady state capital stock with asymmetric information is smaller than
the capital stock with full information).
4 Endogenous cycles
We now give conditions under which separating and pooling contracts may coexist for
the same w in a credit market equilibrium and we point out a general property of any
selection criterium that could resolve this multiplicity problem.
A selection criterium E is a rule assigning to w ∈ [0, 1] a unique credit market equi-
librium (ϑE , rE ), (remember that, by definition of equilibrium, ϑE ∈ θ(rE)). We define
this rule as a map
E(w) = (rE(w), ϑE (w)).
The existence of multiple market clearing contracts may generate, at some w, a
“sudden” discontinuity in the behavior of the equilibrium interest rate r(w) (and, hence,
of the proportion of risky contracts λ and the production of materials z as functions of
w). The discontinuity may be induced, for instance, by a change of regime, i.e., a switch
from a deterministic pooling to a deterministic separating contract (or vice versa), or
by a discontinuous choice among the multiple separating equilibria. Let λE(w) be the
credit market equilibrium proportion of H-projects generated by the selection criterium
E . More precisely, we give the following definition.
Definition 3 Given a selection E, we say that there is a discontinuous switch at w′, if
(rE(w), λE (w)) is discontinuous at w′.
Now recall that n denotes the cardinality of the set of switching points r∗i ∈ (0, α¯).
The following proposition states that discontinuous switches always occur when n ≥ 2.
Proposition 12 Let n > 1. Then, (i) there exists a multiplicity of market clearing
contracts, (ii) for each selection E(w) there exists a w at which there is a discontinuous
switch.
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Proof. It is sufficient to analyze the case n = 2. It is immediate from the argument,
that this is without loss of generality. Since the case in which rs(w) is not a singleton
for r ∈ As can only make multiple equilibria and discontinuous selections more likely, we
will also assume e ≥ eˆ. By proposition 7, this assumption guarantees that rs(w) ∩As is
a decreasing function. Finally, to save notation, we just use rs(w) to denote rs(w) ∩As.
For n = 2, [0, 1] is partitioned in three intervals, Ij = [r∗j , r∗j+1], j = 0, 1, 2, with r∗0 = 0
and r∗3 = α¯. Furthermore, A = I0 ∪ I2 and As = I1. By lemma 5 and proposition 7,
wpi > wsi for all i and both w
p
i and wsi are decreasing in i. Hence, either (a) ws1 ∈ (w
p
2, w
p
1)
or (b) ws1 ≤ w
p
2.
To prove (i), observe that, if (a) holds, for w ∈ (ws2, w
p
2) the contracts
C(rs(w)) with θ(rs(w)) = 1,
C(rp(w)) with θ(rp(w)) = 0,
C(r∗2) with θ(r∗2) = ϑ∗i (w),
are all optimal and they all satisfy the market clearing requirement.
To prove (ii) we argue by contradiction. Evidently, if there exists a continuous
selection for all w ∈ [0, 1], it must be
C(r) =



(cp(rp(w)), cs(rp(w)), 0) for w ∈ [wp1, 1],
(cs(r∗1), cp(r∗1), ϑ∗1(w)) for w ∈ (ws1, w
p
1),
(cs(rs(w)), cp(rs(w)), 1) for w ∈ [ws2, ws1].
However, since I2 is pooling, the only possible contract that we can select for w ∈
[0, ws2) is C(r) = (cs(rp(w)), cp(ρp(w)), 1). Hence, for such a selection, there is a discon-
tinuous regime switch at ws2. Q.E.D.
The last proposition implies that the lack of continuous selections is independent of
the existence of multiple separating contracts. However, if rs(w)∩As is a continuous (and
decreasing) function and n ≤ 1, r(w) is, by proposition 9, a non increasing function and
ϑ(w) is trivially continuous. Furthermore, proposition 3 provides a sufficient condition
for n ≤ 1, while proposition 7 shows that e ≥ eˆ suffices to make rs(w)∩As a (decreasing)
function.
To illustrate the consequences on the equilibrium dynamics of regime switching, we
consider a specific example.
Suppose that e ≥ eˆ, so that, by proposition 7, rs(w) is a decreasing function. It
will be apparent that this assumption plays no role. Most importantly, suppose that
S∗ = {r∗1, r∗2}, with α¯ > r∗2 > r∗1 > 0 and w
p
1 = 1, ws1 > w
p
2. Remember that, in this
situation, optimal contracts must assign θ(r) = 0 for r ∈ [0, r∗1) ∪ (r∗2 , α¯] and θ(r) = 1,
for r ∈ (r∗1 , r∗2). Since n > 1, by proposition 12 there is no selection criterium E making
rE(w) a continuous function.
It will be sufficient, for our purposes, to define a selection criterium E in the interval
[ws2, w
p
2 ]. Setting w¯ = (w
p
2 + ws2)/2, E is implicitly defined in [ws2, w
p
2], by the following
conditions:
w ∈ [ws2, w¯] ⇒ rE (w) = rs(w), ϑE(w) = 1;
w ∈ (w¯, wp2] ⇒ rE (w) = rp(w), ϑE(w) = 0;
21
E selects the separating contract in the interval [ws2, w¯] and the pooling contract in
(w¯, wp2 ]. In particular, rE(w¯) = rs(w¯), while
lim
w↓wp2
rE(w) = rp(w¯).
Most importantly, the adopted selection criterium generates a discontinuity in the pro-
portion of H-projects: as w crosses w¯ from the right, λ(rE (w)) jumps upward discontin-
uously. This is shown in the next proposition:
Proposition 13 λ(rE(w¯)) = λs(rs(w¯)) < limw↓wp2 λ(rE (w)) = λ
p(rp(w¯)).
Proof. By the market clearing conditions:
Bp(rp(w¯)) = (1−G(λs(rs(w¯)))BL(rs(w¯))) +G(λs(rs(w¯)) = w¯.
Hence, Bp(rp(w¯)) is a convex combination of BL(rs(w¯)) and 1. Therefore,
Bp(rp(w¯)) < 1 ⇒ Bp(rp(w¯)) > BL(rs(w¯)).
Furthermore, since w¯ ∈ [0, wp2) ∩ (ws2, ws1) and rp(w) is strictly decreasing in (0, 1), it
follows that rp(w¯) > r∗2, rs(w¯) ∈ [r∗1, r∗2 ]. Hence, rp(w¯) > rs(w¯). By the definition of
Rp(.) and by the inequalities pL > pHG(λp(.)) + pL(1−G(λp(.)) and rp(w¯) > rs(w¯), we
have Rp(r(w¯)) > rp(w¯)/pL > rs(w¯)/pL = RL(r(w¯)). Then, the definitions of λp and λs
imply the thesis. Q.E.D.
This proposition points out a general problem with selection criteria for economies
with n > 1. Every time the selection criterium implies a regime switch from separating
to pooling contracts as w increases, the proportion of H-projects goes up abruptly.
Although for n = 2 this type of regime switch is avoidable (i.e., it is always possible to
construct selections where the switches are from pooling to separating), the phenomenon
seems somewhat structural for high values of n.
Evidently, the discontinuity in λ(.) translates into a discontinuity of Φe(w), as defined
in equation 8. Since a sudden increase in λ generates a sudden decrease in the production
of the material, the following inequality holds true
Φe(w¯) > lim
w↓w¯
Φe(w).
This discontinuity may be a source of endogenous dynamic fluctuations. In particular,
the map Φe(w) may not have a steady state w∗e . If, given our adopted selection criterium,
there is no steady state w∗e , we have the following situation:
Φe(w) > w for w ∈ [0, w¯],
Φe(w) < w for w ∈ (w¯, 1].
This implies that the equilibrium trajectory {wt; t ≥ 0} permanently fluctuates in the
interval (0, 1] for all initial conditions w0 ∈ (0, 1]. Figure 2 shows a diagrammatic rep-
resentation of a cycle of period 2. The example proves that the model can explain an
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endogenous reversion mechanism. Low wages induce borrowers to select good projects so
as to produce higher wages in next periods. In turn, high wages induce agents to choose
bad projects setting up the conditions for a downturn. It should be stressed, however,
that discontinuous regime switches may as well generate the opposite type of disconti-
nuity for the map Φe(w). Namely, the curve representing this map may jump upward as
w crosses a given threshold from the left. In this case we would expect multiple steady
states.
5 Conclusions and Extensions.
Using a version of a celebrated model by Stiglitz and Weiss [16], this paper shows that
the interplay of moral hazard and adverse selection in the market for loans implies that
risky and socially costly actions made by profit maximizing entrepreneurs may be more
pervasive in booms other than recessions. Hence, by embedding the Stiglitz-Weiss model
in a general equilibrium framework, we may argue that credit market imperfections
do not necessarily amplificate the effects of exogenous shocks. Multiple steady states
and endogenous fluctuations are a more likely phenomena. This is in contrast with what
comes out from most of the literature in the field. For example, [1], [2] and [12] show that
asymmetric information or limited commitment in credit markets amplificate business
cycle fluctuations. Our results show that business cycle theory may be very sensitive to
the way information and market frictions in credit markets are modeled.
Our model is admittedly very simple, mainly because we assume that contracts are
single-period and borrowers have no endowment. In particular, a natural objection to
this model is that we are overlooking the importance of the borrowers’ balance sheet and
the role of collateral. As a partial answer to this type of criticism, in appendix 4 we
study the case in which entrepreneurs are endowed with some positive amount E < 1 of
the consumption good in the first period of their life. In this case, contracts may include
the following additional components: some amount W ∈ [0, E] to be invested by the
borrower in a “secure deposit” (yielding the return r) and some payment V ≥ 0 to be
delivered by the borrower to the lender in the case in which the project fails. We find
that:
• W and V play no role in defining the optimal contracts in the sense that their value
is either zero or left undefined in the optimal contract;
• credit rationing still occurs when E + w < 1;
• pooling contracts are independent of E when credit is rationed, i.e., Bp < 1−E;
• the range of r for which optimal contracts are pooling is increasing in E.
The key result is that pooling contracts are more likely to be optimal when borrowers
have a (relatively) large endowment. The intuition is that a larger E reduces the lenders’
exposure with high risk borrowers and, hence, their need to separate risky from safe
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types. To give a sense of the effects of introducing endowments on the type of contracts
prevailing in the model, consider that, with the uniform distribution G(s) = s, optimal
contracts are pooling for all r (and w) when
E ≥ 1− e/4(1 − µ).
If we assume, as usual in business cycle models, that E is procyclical, we should
expect pooling contracts to be more likely in booms, both because a high w implies a
low r (as shown in section 4, optimal contracts are always pooling when r is small) and
because E is larger.
Hence, the effect of introducing the endowment E is ambiguous. On the one hand,
a large E may eliminate rationing along with any interesting dynamics of intertemporal
equilibria. On the other hand, when E is not too big, the set of wage rates for which
optimal contracts are pooling is larger and, provided that credit rationing still occurs
(w < 1), this makes the prociclycality of λ more likely.
24
References
[1] Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., “Agency Costs, Net Worth and Business Fluctuations,”
American Economic Review 79, 14-31 (1989).
[2] Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., “Financial Fragility and Economic Performance,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 105, 87-114 (1990).
[3] Bester, H., “Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information,”
American Economic Review 75, 850-855 (1985).
[4] Bester, H., “The Role of Collateral in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information,”.
European Economic Review 31, 887-899 (1987).
[5] Boyd, J., Smith, B.D., “The Equilibrium Allocation of Investment Capital in the
Presence of Adverse Selection and Costly State Verification,” Economic Theory 3,
427-451 (1993).
[6] Caballero, R., Hammour, M., “The Cleansing Effect of Recessions,” American
Economic Review 84, 1350-68 (1994).
[7] Carlstrom, C., Fuerst, T., “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations: A
Computable General Equilibrium Analysis,” American Economic Review 87, 893-
910 (1997).
[8] Chan, Y., Thakor, A.V., “Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral hazard
and Private Information,” The Journal of Finance 42, 345-363 (1987).
[9] Hellwig, M., “Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Competition in Markets
with Adverse Selection.” European Economic Review 31, 319-325, (1987).
[10] Henriet, D., Rochet, J-C., “Efficiency of Market Equilibria with Adverse Selection:
The Case of Insurance,” In: P. Champsaur et al. (eds) Essays in Honor of Edmond
Malinvaud. Cambridge: MIT Press (1990).
[11] Judd, K., “The Law of Large Numbers with a Continuum of I.I.D. Random Vari-
ables”, Journal of Economic Theory 35,19-25 (1985).
[12] Kiyotaki, N., Moore, J., “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political Economy 105, 211-248
(1997).
[13] Mankiw, N. G, “The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 101, 455-70 (1986).
[14] Riley, J., “Informational Equilibrium,” Econometrica 47, 331-59 (1979).
[15] Rothschild, M., Stiglitz, J., “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An
Essay in the Economics of Imperfect Information,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
90, 629-650 (1976).
25
[16] Stiglitz, J., Weiss, A., “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,”
American Economic Review 71, 393-410 (1981).
[17] Suarez, J., Sussman, O., “Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy,” Journal
of Economic Theory 76, 47-71 (1997).
[18] Townsend, R., “Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State
Verification,” Journal of Economic Theory 21, 265-93 (1979).
[19] Wilson, C., “The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection,” Bell
Journal of Economics 11, 108-30 (1980).
26
Appendix 1: Optimal contracts
In this appendix we derive the family of optimal (random) contracts C(r) for a given
opportunity cost of lending r (in units of materials).
As anticipated in section 2, contracts are obtained by maximizing the borrowers’
profit subject to the lenders’ participation constraint. The presence of a continuum
of borrowers’ types allows for many possible and alternative choices of the Planner’s
objective function. We make this function equal to the profit of the most inefficient
borrower, i.e., the borrower of type s = 1. When λ < 1 the profit of the least efficient
borrower is piL(.), while his profit is piH1 (.) when λ = 1. Since every borrower is free to
select projects, our criterium is equivalent to the maximization of a “reservation” profit
for all types of entrepreneurs.
Hence, for all given r ∈ [0, α¯], we seek triples C = (cs, cp, θ), with (cs, cp) ≥ 0 and
y ∈ [0, 1], maximizing:
W(C) = θpiL(cL) + (1− θ)max{piL(cp), piH1 (cp)},
subject to :
Bκ ≤ 1, (κ = H,L, p) (CC)
(α¯− pHRH)BH ≥ (α¯− pHRL)BL, (IC1)
(α¯− pLRL)BL ≥ (α¯− pLRH)BH , (IC2)
pjRj ≥ r, (j = H,L), (ZPS)
Rp
[
pHG(λ) + pL(1−G(λ))
]
≥ r. (ZPP)
The form of the objective function follows from the following consideration. If, at
a separating contract c′s = (c′L, c′H), every borrower applies for the contract c′H , then
λ = 1. Hence, we can identify, without loss of generality, c′s with the pooling contract
cp = c′H . By adopting this convention, we rule out the possibility that, at a separating
contract, λ = 1.
Condition (CC) is the capacity constraint, (IC1) and (IC2) are the incentive compat-
ibility constraints and (ZPS) is a NCS condition. By (ZPS) and (ZPP), contracts satisfy
the standard participation constraint, i.e., the cost of lending cannot exceed the expected
return of each contract in the optimal offer. Furthermore, given the adopted objective
function, we need not write down explicitly the borrowers’ individual rationality con-
straints. Since Bκ = 0 (κ = H,L, p) is always feasible, it must be piL(cκ) ≥ 0 (and hence
piH(cκ) ≥ 0) at any solution of the programming problem. These inequalities, together
with the other constraints, imply Bκ ∈ [0, 1] for κ = p, s, Rj ∈ [0, αj ] for j = H,L and
Rp ∈ [0, αH ]. Hence, the (relevant part of) the feasible set is compact.
The separability in cs and cp, the linearity in θ of the objective function and the NCS
condition imply that the optimality problem separates in two programming problems
defining, respectively, optimal separating and optimal pooling contracts. More specifi-
cally, for given r, an optimal pooling contract cp is a solution to
(P.p) max(B,R)≥0{max{piL(cp), piH1 (cp)}} s.to: (CC), (ZPP),
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while, an optimal separating contracts c = (cL, cH) is a solution to
(P.s) max(BL,BH ,RL,RH)≥0 piL(cL) s.to: (CC), (IC1), (IC2), (ZPS).
In the sequel, cj(r) and pij(r), j = p, s, will denote the set of optimal solutions to
and the value functions of the programs (P.κ), κ = s, p. If, at r, pip(r) > (<)pis(r),
the optimal random contract implies θ(r) = 0 (θ(r) = 1) and it degenerates in the
pooling (separating) contract. Optimal random contracts are non trivial lotteries over
the two deterministic contracts only when pip(r) = pis(r). In such a situation, any
θ ∈ [0, 1] is optimal, i.e., θ(r) = [0, 1]. It is evident that if, for instance, θ(r) = 0,
the actual specification of the separating component is immaterial. However, it will
be convenient and without loss of generality to specify the set of optimal contracts as
the array C(r) = (cs(r), cp(r), θ(r)). Since θ ∈ (0, 1) only when pip(r) = pis(r), the
introduction of random offers does not increase the value of the objective function and
it is inessential for optimality.
We denote by S∗ the set of values of r at which the function pis(r)−pip(r) is equal to
zero and we call r∗ ∈ S∗ a switching point. In our model, for a generic set of values of
the set up cost e, S∗ is either an empty or a finite set. We call a subset of R++ generic
if it is both open and of full Lebesgue measure. This is stated and proved formally in
a later stage in this appendix (see lemma 4), since the proof requires some additional
notions and results. From now on, we limit our attention to the generic set of set up
costs for which the previous lemma holds true. Hence, S∗ is a finite collection of points,
{r∗1, ..., r∗n} and, by convention, r∗i < r∗i+1.
Proof of propositions 1, 4, 5.
The proof of proposition 1 is divided in three steps. In the first we characterize cs(r), in
the second cp(r) and in the last θ(r). From now on we simplify the notation by setting
µ = pH/pL and σ = pL(1− µ)/α¯e.
Step 1: optimal separating contracts. As already explained in the text, at an
optimal separating contract, λ < 1. Thus optimal separating contracts must be a solution
to the following problem:
(P.s)
{
max(cH ,cL)(α¯− pLRL)BL s.t.:
(CC), (IC1), (IC2), (ZPS)
As we have already observed, piL(cL) ≥ 0 (and hence piH(cH) ≥ 0) at any optimal
solution, since BL = BH = 0, Rj = αj is feasible. Furthermore, all additional constraints
in the programming problem (P.s) are weak inequalities. Hence, the search for optimal
separating contracts is in a compact region contained in the compact set {(Bj , Rj)j=H,L :
Bj ∈ [0, 1] and Rj ∈ [0, αj ], j = L,H}. The following Lemma characterizes the properties
of the unique optimal separating contract cs(r) = (cH(r), cL(r)) that solves problem
(P.s).
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Lemma 1 A contract cs(r) solving problem (P.s) is such that:
pHRH(r) = pLRL(r) = r, (10)
BH(r) = 1, (11)
BL(r) = α¯− rα¯− µr . (12)
Proof. We break the argument in four steps. Let pi∗L be the value of the objective
function with the proposed solution. Summing the two IC constraints, we get that the
following inequality must be satisfied by any feasible cs:
BHRH ≥ BLRL (A)
(I) Either BH = 1 or BL = 1. In fact, if Bκ < 1 for all κ ∈ {p, s}, we can increase the
value of the objective function by increasing both BL and BH , while keeping their
ratio constant so as to satisfy any constraint.
(II) BL < 1 and BH = 1. Suppose, by contradiction, that BL = 1. By (A), (IC1)
implies that BH = 1 and RH = RL = ρ. Then, since ∂piL/∂RL < 0, pHRH =
pHρ = r, while pLRL = r/µ. At (BL, RL) = (1, r/µ), the value of the objective
function is (α¯− r/µ) < pi∗L. Hence, BL < 1 and, by (I), BH = 1.
(III) (IC1) holds with equality, (IC2) holds with strict inequality and pLRL = r. Sup-
pose, by contradiction, that (IC1) holds with a strict inequality. Then, by (II), BL
can be increased by an arbitrarily small amount, without violating the incentive
compatibility constraints. Since the objective function is increasing in BL, this
implies a contradiction. Thus, (IC1) is binding. However, if (IC1) is binding, (IC2)
must be satisfied with a strict inequality, otherwise, by trivial computations, BL
would be equal to 1, contradicting (II).
(IV) pHRH = r. If, by contradiction, pHRH > r, by (III), RH can be decreased without
contradicting any constraint and making both incentive compatibility constraints
hold with a strict inequality. Then, BL can be increased without violating any
constraint and increasing the value of the objective function. A contradiction.
(V) pLRL = r. Suppose, by contradiction, that pLRL > r. Since (IC1) is binding,
RL = [pHRH − α¯(1−BL)]/pHBL ≡ ρ1(BL). Hence,
ρ′1(BL) =
α¯− pHRH
pH(BL)2 > 0.
Since BL < 1, pLRL > r and (IC2) is satisfied with a strict inequality, changes
(∆BL,∆RL) =
(
∆BL, ρ′1(BL)∆BL
)
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are, for ∆BL small enough, feasible. Let ∆piL be the change of the objective
function induced by (∆BL, ρ′1(BL)∆BL), then:
∆piL =
[
(α¯− pLRL)− pLBLρ′1(BL)
]
∆BL
=
[
(α¯− pLRL)− pL
(
α¯− pHRH
pHBL
)]
∆BL.
However, since (IC1) is binding, we get
∆piL = (α¯− pLRL)− pL
(
α¯− pHRL
pH
)
= α¯
(
1− p
L
pH
)
∆BL.
Since pL > pH , it suffices to select a negative and arbitrarily small ∆BL to generate
a positive increase in the objective function. A contradiction.
Hence, an optimal solution to (P.s) must satisfy (II)-(IV) and the lemma is proved.
Q.E.D.
By the properties of the separating contract, it is readily verified that the proportion
of H-projects is equal to:
λs(r) = σRL(r)BL(r) = σ (α¯− r)r
α¯− µr
.
The function λs(r) is hump shaped, equal to zero at r = 0 and r = α¯ and possibly
greater than or equal to 1 for some r. Then, there is a closed subinterval Is = [rs1, rs2] ⊂
(0, α¯), possibly empty, such that λs(r) = 1, for r ∈ Is, i.e., no optimal contract can
be separating for r ∈ Is (or, equivalently, separating and pooling contracts are, for all
practical matters, indistinguishable).
Now let pis(r) = max{piL(cs), piH1 (cs)} for cs in the constrained set defined by (CC),
(IC1), (IC2), (ZPS). The above discussion implies that:
pis(r) =
{
(α¯− r)− α¯e for r ∈ Is;
(α¯− r)2/(α¯ − µr) for r ∈ [0, α¯] \ Is,
Step 2: optimal pooling contracts. At a pooling contract, λp(r) = min{1, σBpRp}.
When λp(r) = 1 the contract is trivially defined by Rp = r/pH and Bp = 1. Otherwise,
it is a solution to:
(P.p) max(B,R)(α¯− pLR)B s.t.: (CC), (ZPP), σBpRp ≤ 1.
Once again, B = 0 is always feasible and all constraints in (P.p) are weak inequalities.
Hence, the search for optimal pooling contracts is in a compact region contained in the
compact set {(Bp, Rp) : Bp ∈ [0, 1] and Rp ∈ [0, αH ]}. In the programming problem
(P.p) neither the objective function is concave nor the constraint set is convex. However,
assumption 1 makes (P.p) a convex programming problem.
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Lemma 2 Let Ip = {r : λp(r) = 1}. Under assumption 1, there is a unique optimal
pooling contract cp(r) with the following characterization. If Ip 6= ∅, Ip = [rp1, r
p
2 ] ⊂ (0, α¯)
and there is a value rˆ and a continuous function λp(r) such that:
• rˆ = rp1, if Ip 6= ∅, rˆ ∈ (0, α¯), otherwise;
• λp(r) = 1 for r ∈ Ip, λp(r) strictly increasing in [0, rˆ), strictly decreasing in (rˆ, α¯]\
Ip and λp(0) = λp(α¯) = 0;
• Bp(r) = 1, for r ∈ [0, rˆ]∪ Ip, Bp(α¯) = 0, Bp(r) strictly decreasing in [rˆ, α¯] \ Ip and
Rp(r) = (r/pL)[1− (1− µ)G(λp(r))]−1 for r ∈ [0, α¯].
Proof. Since both the objective function and λp are monotonic in B, solutions in Cp(r)
satisfy (ZPP) with equality. Hence:
pLRp(r)[1− (1− µ)G(λp(r))] = r. (13)
Now define T (λ) = α¯ (1− (1− µ)G(λ)) λ. By equation 13 and the definition of λ,
problem (P.p) can be restated as
(P.p′) maxλ∈[0,1]Q(λ, r) s.t.: T (λ) ≤ σrα¯/pL,
where Q(λ, r) = T (λ)− rλ.
Let Λp(r) be the set of solutions to problem (P.p′). Notice that Q(0, r) = 0, T (0) < σr
for r > 0 and ∂Q(0, r)/∂λ = α¯− r, ∂T (0)/∂λ = pLα¯ > 0. Then, λ > 0 for all λ ∈ Λp(r)
with r ∈ (0, α¯) and Λp(α¯) = Λp(0) = {0}. Furthermore, by the maximum theorem, the
continuity of T (.) and Q(.) and the compactness of the constrained set imply that Λp(r)
is an upper hemi continuous correspondence.
Now we show that Λp(r) = {λp(r)}, where λp(r) is a function. Since all λ ∈ Λp(r)
are positive, either ∂T (λ)/∂λ− r = 0 or ∂T (λ)/∂λ− r ≥ 0, where the second possibility
implies T (λ) = α¯σr/pL if λ < 1. Hence, for λ ∈ Λp(r), ∂T (λ)/∂λ > 0. However,
assumption 1 implies that Q(.) and T (.) are strictly concave in λ. Hence, the constraint
set of P.p′ is the union of two disjoint intervals, I1 = [0, ξ1(r)], I2 = [ξ2(r), 1], where I2 is
possibly empty, ξ1(r) ∈ (0, 1] and ξ1(r) < ξ2(r). Since ∂T (0)/∂λ > 0, ∂T (ξ1(r))/∂λ > 0,
∂T (ξ2(r))/∂λ < 0. Since ∂T (.)/∂λ > 0 for λ ∈ Λp(r), must be Λp(r) ⊂ I1. Hence,
the strict concavity of Q(.) and the convexity of I1 imply that Λp(r) = {λp(r)} is a
continuous function.
By the implicit function theorem, ξ1(r) is an increasing function of r. By the
strict concavity of the objective function in (P.p′), there exists a unique η(r) such that
∂Q(η(r), r)/∂λ = 0. Then, λp(r) = min{η(r), ξ1(r)}. Since ξ1(0) = 0, η(0) > 0,
η(α¯) = 0, ξ1(r) is increasing, while η(r) is decreasing. Then, there is a subinterval
Ip = [ρp1, ρ
p
2] ⊂ (0, α¯), possibly empty, and a value rˆ ∈ (0, α¯), with rˆ = r
p
1, when Ip 6= ∅,
such that:
λp(r) =



ξ1(r) for r ∈ [0, rˆ] \ Ip,
1 for r ∈ Ip,
η(r) for r ∈ [rˆ, α¯] \ Ip.
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Hence, the unique contract c¯(r) solving problem (P.p) satisfies:
σB¯(r)R¯(r) = λp(r), R¯(r) = r
pL[1− (1− µ)G(λp(r))]
.
Since the Planner’s objective is to maximize max{piL(c), piH1 (c)}, we know that an optimal
contract is characterized by R = r/pH and B = 1 when λ = 1. Hence, the unique optimal
pooling contract cp(r) satisfies:
cp(r) = c¯(r), for r ∈ [0, α¯] \ Ip,
cp(r) = (1, r/pH), for r ∈ Ip.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 pip(r) = max{piL(cp(r)), piH1 (cp(r))} is strictly decreasing in [0, α¯] and such
that ∂2pip(r)/∂r2 < 0, for r ∈ (0, rˆ) and, if Ip 6= ∅, ∂2pip(r)/∂r2 = 0 for r ∈ (rp1, r
p
2).
Proof. Consider r ∈ [rˆ, α¯) \ Ip. By the envelope theorem:
∂pip(r)
∂r =
∂Q(λp(r), r)
∂r = −
pLα¯
r2 (1− (1− µ)G(λ
p(r))) λp(r) < 0.
For r ∈ (0, rˆ), T (λp(r)) = α¯σr/pL and pip(r) = 1− (pLλp(r)/σ). Then:
∂pip/∂r = −(pL/σ)∂λp(r)/∂r, ∂2pip/∂r2 = −(pL/σ)∂2λp(r)/∂r2,
where the first and second derivatives of λp(r) are obtained by total differentiation of
the equation T (λp(r)) = σr, i.e.:
∂λp(r)/∂r = (σ/pL)[1− (1− µ)H(λp(r)],
∂2λp(r)/∂r2 = σ(1− µ)H
′(λp(r))
pL[1− (1− µ)H(λp(r))]2 ∂λ
p(r)/∂r.
where H(λ) = (G(λ) + λg(λ)).
Lemma 2 implies that ∂λp(r)/∂r > 0, and, therefore, ∂pip/∂r < 0, for r ∈ (0, rˆ).
Furthermore, for r ∈ [ρp1, ρ
p
2], the constraint λ(r) ≤ 1 is binding and, hence,
Q(λp(r), r) = (α¯[1− (1− µ)G(λp(r))]− r)λ = α¯µ− r.
Hence, the thesis. Q.E.D.
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Step 3: optimal contracts. We are now ready to characterize θ(r), thereby com-
pleting the study of the optimal contract (cs, cp, θ)(r). If pis(r) > pip(r) (pis(r) < pip(r)),
the optimal contract is separating (pooling), i.e., θ(r) = 1 (θ(r) = 0). If r is such that
pis(r) = pip(r), the random contract (cs(r), cp(r), θ) is optimal for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. By direct
computations and by the previous Lemma, pis(0) = pip(0) = α¯, pis(α¯) = pip(α¯) = 0 and
∂pis/∂r |r=0= µ− 2 < −1 = ∂pip/∂r |r=0 .
Hence, there exists r∗ ∈ (0, α¯] such that pip(r) > pis(r) for r ∈ (0, r∗). This completes
the proof of proposition 1. Q.E.D.
We have now all the elements needed to characterize the properties of the set of
switching points. We call a subset A ⊂ R++ generic if it is both open and of full
Lesbegue measure. The proof of the next Lemma is a trivial application of the joint
transversality theorem.
Lemma 4 For e in a generic subset of R++, the set S∗ of switching point is either
empty or finite. For each r∗i ∈ S∗, i = 0, 1, ..., n, either pip(r) > pis(r) for all r in a
left neighborhood of r∗i and pip(r) < pis(r) for all r in a right neighborhood of r∗, or vice
versa.
Proof. First we show that the lemma is true for e in a full Lebesgue measure set of
R++. Then, we prove that this set is open as well.
Consider the function f(r, e) = pis(r, e)−pip(r, e), for e > 0. For each e > 0, f(α¯, e) =
f(0, e) = 0. From step 3 in the proof of lemma , ∂f(0, e)/∂r < 0, and, hence, r = 0 is
a locally isolated zero of f , for all e > 0. Furthermore, from the proof of proposition 2,
∂f(α¯, e)/∂r = 0, ∂2pis(α¯, e)/∂r2 = −2/(α¯(1− µ) and ∂2pip(α¯, e)/∂r2 = −σ/α¯. Thus, for
e ∈ K = {e > 0 : σ 6= 2/1 − µ}, ∂2f(α¯, e)/∂r 6= 0. Hence, for each e ∈ K, r = α¯ is a
locally isolated zero of ∂f/∂r, and, since f(α¯, e) = 0, α¯ a locally isolated zero of f (just
take a second order Taylor expansion in a neighborhood of α¯). Now, consider the map
f : (0, 1) ×K → R. Bear in mind that we are restricting the domain of the map f to
not include the points r = α¯ and r = 0. Since, ∂pis/∂e = 0, while ∂pip/∂e < 0, the map
f is transversal to zero. Let fe(r) denote the map f for given value of e. By the joint
transversality theorem, there exists a full Lebesgue measure subset of K, K∗, such that
either f−1e (0) = ∅ or, for r ∈ f−1e (0), ∂f(r, e)/∂r 6= 0, for e ∈ K∗. Thus, by the implicit
function theorem, the solutions r∗i are locally isolated. If they are not finite, they must
have either r = 0 or r = α¯ as accumulation points. However, this is excluded by the fact
that both of them are locally isolated solutions of f(r, e) = 0. Hence, S∗(e) is a finite set
for all e ∈ K∗.
In order to show that K∗ is open, pick a point eˆ ∈ K∗. If f−1eˆ (0) = ∅, by the
continuity of f and by the fact that both 0 and α¯ are locally isolated zeros, f−1e (0) = ∅,
for e in an open neighborhood of eˆ. If, on the other hand, f−1eˆ (0) 6= 0, the implicit
function theorem immediately implies that fe is transversal to zero, for e in some open
neighborhood of eˆ. Hence, K∗ is open and of full Lebesgue measure. Q.E.D.
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Proof of proposition 2.
From the proof of proposition 1, the Planner’s objective function with θ = 1 is:
pis(r) = (α¯− r)2/(α¯− µr),
whereas the Planner’s objective function with θ = 0 is:
pip(r) = α¯− (pL/σ)λp(r) if r ≤ ro ∈ (0, α¯)
pip(r) = e(α¯)2λp(r)2g(λp(r))/r if r > ro,
where ro ∈ (0, α¯) is such that Bp(r) = 1, for r ∈ [0, ro], while Bp(r) < 1, for r ∈ (ro, α¯].
Equivalently, the capacity constraint T (λ) ≤ α¯(σ/q)r/pL is binding for r ∈ [0, ro), while
it is not binding, for r ∈ [ro, α¯]. Hence, λp(r) is decreasing in e for r < ro and independent
of e otherwise. Then, pip(r) is increasing in e and pis(r) is independent of e. Since at r∗1
we have pip(r∗1) = pis(r∗1), pip(r) > pis(r) for r < r∗1, r∗1 is an increasing function of e.
Now assume that r∗1 → r∗ < α¯ as e→∞. Notice that, for all r, there is a big enough
value e(r) such that (CC) becomes a binding constraint. Hence, for all e ≥ e(r∗), must
be (α¯ − r)2/(α¯ − µr) > α¯ − (pL/σ)λp(r) for all r ∈ (r∗, α¯). However, e → ∞ implies
λp(r)→ 0. Hence, for e big enough and r ∈ (r∗, α¯), α¯ > (α¯− r)2/(α¯−µr) > α¯, which is
a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3.
Recall that in the proof of proposition 1 Ip and Is have been defined as the subintervals
of [0, α¯] such that λp(r) = λs(r) = 1. For r ∈ Is, the optimal contract is pooling and, for
r /∈ Is, pis(r) = (α¯ − r)/(α¯ − µr). Hence, we just need to compare this expression with
pip(r). Notice that pip(r) is concave in [0, rˆ] ∪ Ip, while pis(r) is strictly convex in [0, α¯].
Furthermore, pis(0) = pip(0) = α¯ and ∂pis/∂r < ∂pip/∂r at r = 0. Hence, there is at most
one switching point in r∗ ∈ [0, ρˆ]∪ Ip. Finally, recall from the proof of proposition 1 that
Bp(r) = 1, for r ∈ [0, rˆ] ∪ Ip and, for r ∈ (rˆ, α¯) \ Ip, Bp(r) < 1 and:
G(λp(r)) + λp(r)g(λp(r)) = (α¯− r)/(1− µ)α¯.
Now let
A(r) = p
Lλ[α¯− r − α¯(1− µ)G(λ)]
(σ)(α¯ − r)2 , N(r) =
r
α¯− µr ,
and observe that, for r ∈ (rˆ, α¯)\{Ip∪Is}, N(r) ≥ A(r)⇔ pis(r) ≥ pip(r). It is N ′(r) > 0
and A′(r) ≤ 0 ⇔ sg(s)/G(s) ≤ 1. Hence, if there is a switching point r∗2 ∈ (rˆ, α¯) \ Ip,
A(r∗2) = N(r∗2) and, then, pis(r) > pip(r), for r ∈ (r∗2 , α¯), while pis(r) < pip(r) for
r ∈ {(rˆ, α¯) \ Ip} ∩ (0, r∗2). However, pis(r) < pip(r) for r ∈ (rˆ, α¯) \ Ip ∩ (0, r∗2) if and only
if it does not exists a switching point in (0, rˆ] ∪ Ip, otherwise the inequality is reversed.
Hence, the thesis. Q.E.D.
34
Appendix 2: Loan market and intertemporal equilibria
Proof of proposition 6.
By proposition 1, Bp(r) = 1, for r ∈ [0, rˆ] ∪ Ip, while ∂Bp(r)/∂r < 0, for r ∈ (rˆ, α¯] \ Ip.
Hence, rp : [0, 1) → [0, α¯] is a decreasing function. Bs(r) is continuous with Bs(0) = 1,
Bs(α¯) = 0. Hence, for any given w ∈ [0, 1], there rs(w) is non empty. However, Bs(r) is
not monotonic and, hence, rs(w) may be non unique.
If S∗ = ∅, the optimal contracts are pooling for any r ∈ [0, α¯]. Hence, since
Bp([0, α¯]) = [0, 1], if S∗ = ∅, there exists a market clearing equilibrium for each r ∈ [0, α¯].
Now suppose that there are n switching points and let r∗0 = 0, r∗n+1 = α¯. The closed
interval Ii = [r∗i , r∗i+1] is called pooling (separating) if the pooling (separating) contract
is optimal for r ∈ Ii. By proposition 1, I0 is pooling and, by the definition of switching
points, Ii is pooling, if i is even, and separating, if i is odd. Let wji (j = p, s) be defined
by r∗i = rp(w
p
i ) and r∗i ∈ rs(wsi ). The following lemma shows that the relative magnitude
of these points can be evaluated.
Lemma 5 wpi > wsi .
Proof. By construction, at a separating contract λs(r) < 1. Therefore, since r∗i ∈ (0, 1),
wsi < 1. Suppose that w
p
i < 1 (otherwise, there is nothing to prove). By the definitions
of pis and pip given in section 4 and since we are assuming wji < 1, (j = s, p), we are only
considering switching points r∗i for which λs(r∗i ) and λp(r∗i ) are both less than 1. Then,
omitting the index i, pis(r∗) = BL(r∗)(α¯ − r∗), pip(r∗) = α¯wp − pLλp(r∗)/σ. It follows
that wp = BL(r∗)(1− r∗/α¯) + pLλp(r∗)/σα¯ and:
ws = BL(r∗) +G(λs(r∗))(1 −BL(r∗)).
Using the above expressions along with the definitions of λs(r) and λp(r) we get:
wp − ws = eα¯α¯− r∗ [λ
p(r∗)G(λp(r∗))− λs(r∗)G(λs(r∗))].
Since λp(r∗) > λs(r∗), we have wp − ws > 0. Q.E.D.
By the continuity of Bp(r) and Bs(r), both Bp(Ii), i odd, and Bs(Ii), i even, are
intervals contained in [0, 1]. However, by the last claim, wpi > wsi , and, hence, there
might not exists deterministic contracts that clear the market for w ∈ (wsi , w
p
i ). If, for
some i, this is the case, consider an optimal random contract offer (cs, cp, θ)(r∗i ). For this
contract offer, the market clearing condition is:
ϑBs(r∗i ) + (1− ϑ)Bp(r∗i ) = w,
which can be rewritten as ϑwsi + (1− ϑ)w
p
i = w. Hence, for w ∈ (wsi , w
p
i ) and for:
ϑ(w) = w
p
i − w
wpi − wsi
∈ [0, 1],
(cs, cp, ϑ(w))(r∗i ) clears the loan market. Since Bp(0) = 1 and Bp(α¯) = Bs(α¯) = 0, the
proof is complete. Q.E.D.
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Proof of proposition 10.
First we show that the map Φe is increasing in [0, 1]. By direct computations, m
′
e(w) =
eλg(λ)(∂λ/∂w) < 1. Hence, by proposition 9, Φe(w) is increasing in the intervals
[0, Bs(r∗)) and (Bp(r∗), 1]. To conclude this part of the argument we have to show
that, at the switching point r∗,
Φe(wp)−Φe(ws) = wp − ws − (me(wp)−me(ws)) > 0.
As we have shown in the proof of proposition 6, at the switching point, it is
wp − ws = eα¯α¯− r∗ [λ
p(r∗)G(λp(r∗))− λs(r∗)G(λs(r∗))] > 0.
Furthermore, integrating by parts (and taking into account that λp(r∗) > λs(r∗),
me(wp)−me(ws) =
∫ λp(r∗1)
λs(r∗1)
esdG(s) =
= e(λp(r∗)G(λp(r∗))− λs(r∗)G(λs(r∗))−
∫ λp(r∗1)
λs(r∗1 )
eGds.
Hence,
Φe(wp)− Φe(ws) ≥
er∗
α¯− r∗ [λ
p(r∗)G(λp(r∗))− λs(r∗)G(λs(r∗))] > 0.
Since at both w = 0 and w = 1, me(w) = m0(w), the assumption 6 guarantees the
existence of a fixed point of Φe, for e ≥ 0. This assumption also shows that Φ
′
e(w∗e) < 1
for at least one fixed point w∗e . Finally, w∗e < w∗0 for e > 0 follows from Φ0(w) > Φe(w)
for e > 0. Q.E.D.
Appendix 3: Optimality and decentralization
In this appendix we provide an answer to the question whether optimal contracts as
defined in this paper arise as the equilibrium outcome of a competitive market.
Within the pure adverse selection model (λ constant), Rothschild and Stiglitz [15]
have shown that all Nash equilibria of a two stage insurance game are optimal within
the class of contracts that satisfy the no cross subsidizing condition. The equilibrium
contracts are always separating and they imply that the safe types (borrowers) are ra-
tioned. However, equilibria fail to exist when the proportion of safe borrowers in the total
population is sufficiently high, i.e., when separating contracts are inefficient. In this case
a pooling contract can always upset any pair of separating contracts. Moreover, within
the two stage game framework (adopted by Rothschild and Stiglitz) pooling contracts
are always upset by a separating contract attracting safe borrowers only. The possible
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lack of a Nash equilibrium has led some authors to propose different solution concepts
or different structures for the game (e.g., [19], [14], [9]).
Following [9], we assume that intermediaries and borrowers play a three stage game.
Intermediaries move first by making contract offers. At the second stage, borrowers can
apply for at most one contract. At the third stage, intermediaries decide whether to
accept or reject their applications after they observe the contract offers and the set of
applications. Within the pure adverse selection model (with a NCS condition) Hellwig
shows that a sequential Nash equilibrium always exists. In particular, pooling contracts
are Nash equilibria whenever they Pareto dominate the separating pairs. Therefore,
in the Hellwig game, Nash equilibrium contracts are always efficient. It can be shown
that they can be obtained by maximizing a welfare function subject to the incentive
compatibility constraints and the NCS condition. It turns out that this welfare function
coincides with the profit of the safe borrowers.
The model with endogenous choice of projects analyzed in this paper is more general
than the pure adverse selection model considered by Hellwig. However, we show that the
same result holds true. Namely, the optimal contracts defined in the paper are (subgame
perfect) Nash equilibrium contracts of a three stage Hellwig game.
There exists a finite number of intermediaries, i = 1, 2, ..., N and, for each i, the
opportunity cost of lending equals the (given) interest factor r. Our goal is to show that
the optimal contracts are subgame perfect Nash equilibrium contracts of the three stage
game. We analyze a situation where all intermediaries make the same contract offers
and we sketch an argument for the nonexistence of profitable deviating contract offers.
By the same argument used in section 4, there is no loss of generality in restricting
deterministic (deviating) contract offers to at most a pair of deterministic contracts,
possibly identical. We also allow for contracts that are lotteries over a pooling contract
and a pair of separating contracts.
Let ci (i ∈ {1, .., N}) be the contract offered by intermediary i. Then ci can be
defined as ci = (cpi, (cLi, cHi), θi). If θi = 0 (θi = 1) the contract is deterministic and
separating (pooling). When the contract is random, θi ∈ (0, 1), and if the realization of
the lottery is (cLi, cHi), borrowers indicate whether they choose cLi or cHi. The game is
played by (expected) profit maximizer intermediaries and borrowers. The three stages
of the game are as follows:
1. First stage: Intermediaries design contract offers so as to maximize their expected
profits.
2. Second stage: Each borrower, after having observed the available contract offers,
applies for at most one contract. If the contract is random and the realization of
the lottery is the pair (cL, cH), the borrower indicates whether he chooses cL or cH .
3. Third stage: Intermediaries decide whether to activate each of the designed con-
tracts by accepting or rejecting the applications to that specific contract. If the
contract is random, then, after the lottery is realized, intermediaries can accept
or reject all the applications that specified a choice of one of the three contract
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components of the lottery. In other words, intermediaries can reject or accept all
applications for contract c1p and/or all applications for c1L or c1H . Borrowers, after
having observed the outcome of their applications, select the project to implement.
We assume that, when all intermediaries offer the same contracts, (a) each interme-
diary gets the same size 1/N of applications, (b) the proportion of high risk borrowers
applying for contract k offered by intermediary i, λki , is independent of i. The conse-
quence of (b) for the case where all intermediaries make the same optimal contract offers
is that, for each i, λki is equal to the value of λ associated with the optimal contract.
Since the gross rate of return on the optimal contracts is equal to r, intermediaries realize
zero expected profits when they make the same optimal contract offers.
In the second stage entrepreneurs observe the available contracts and apply for at
most one of them in order to maximize their profits. Hence, they have to select a contract-
application by anticipating which one of them will be accepted at the third stage of the
game. To make this choice they argue by backward induction. If a contract yields
negative profits to the intermediary, it is in his best interest to reject the applications to
that contract. Thus, borrowers only apply for contracts that yield nonnegative profits
to the intermediary.
For deterministic contracts, backward induction implies that the possible deviating
contracts must satisfy a NCS condition. A similar observation holds true for random
contracts. After the realizations of the lotteries, the (ex-ante) pool of applicants is
partitioned into three pools of applicants respectively associated to the deterministic
contracts cj, with j = p, L,H. Since the intermediary can reject applications from any
of these three pools, the three contracts must satisfy a NCS condition.
In lemma 6, 7 and 8, we are going to prove that an optimal contract offer is a Nash
equilibrium. To simplify the argument we give the following definition of a “profitable
deviating contract”. It is understood that deviations are taken by intermediary i when
everybody is playing the same optimal contract offer c∗ = (cp∗, cs∗, θ∗).
For given r and deviating contract ci = (cpi, (cLi, cHi), θi), let λpi be the proportion of
entrepreneurs adopting the H-project and belonging to the pool of applicants associated
to contract cpi and λsi the proportion of entrepreneurs adopting the H-project and
belonging to the pool of applicants associated to contract (cLi, cHi). Let also:
V i(cpi, r) = [(pHλpi + pL(1− λpi))Rpi − r]Bpi,
V i(cji, r) = [pjRji − r]Bji, j = H,L
be the profits of intermediary i generated, respectively, by the pooling and separating
components of the deviating contract ci and:
U j(ci) = max
k∈{H,L}
[θipijs(cki) + (1− θi)pijs(cpi)]
the profit to an entrepreneur s adopting the j-project (j = H,L) and selecting optimally
the component of a separating pair.
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Definition 4 A profitable deviation is a contract offer ci such that:
θiV i(cji, r) ≥ 0 (j = H,L),
(1− θi)V i(cpi, r), ≥ 0
with at least one strict inequality, and U j(ci) > U j(c∗) for some j ∈ {H,L}, where c∗ is
the optimal contract offer.
Lemma 6 Suppose that, at r ∈ (0, α¯), it is θ∗ = 0 (the optimal contract is pooling).
Then, there are no profitable deviating contracts.
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Suppose (with no loss of generality) that i = 1 is a
deviating intermediary and let c1 be a profitable deviation. Then, either (A) the deviating
contract attracts borrowers adopting the L-projects, i.e., UL(c1) > UL(cp∗), or (B) the
deviating contract attracts borrowers adopting the H-projects, i.e., UH(c1) > UH(cp∗).
Consider (A) and remember that cp∗ yields zero profits to the intermediaries (cf.
section 4). If, after the deviation, intermediaries i > 1 accept the applications to contract
cp∗, they will attract entrepreneurs adopting the H-projects only. In this case cp∗ yields
negative profits. Thus, in case (A) every i > 1 must reject the applications for cp
and the deviating contract offer c1 will attract the entire pool of borrowers. However,
UL(c1) > UL(cp∗) and, by definition of profitable deviation, each contract offer c1 makes
nonnegative profits. This contradicts the assumption that cp∗ is an optimal contract.
Now consider (B). After the deviation c1, only borrowers adopting the L-project
apply for contract cp∗. Thus, cp∗ yields now positive profits to intermediaries i > 1. In
particular, the gross rate of return on cp∗ is pLRp∗ > r. Since c1 makes nonnegative
profits and UH(c1) > UH(cp∗), there exists ε > 0 such that cLε = (Bp∗, Rp∗ − ε) and
c1 satisfy UL(cLε ) > UL(cp), UH(c1) > UH(cLε ). This contradicts the optimality of cp∗.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 7 Suppose that, at r ∈ (0, α¯), it is θ∗ ∈ (0, 1). Then, there exist no profitable
deviating contracts.
Proof. The argument is virtually identical to the one given in the previous lemma.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 8 Suppose that, at r ∈ (0, α¯), it is θ∗ = 1 (the optimal contract is separating).
Then, there exist no profitable deviating contracts.
Proof. We argue by contradiction. It is immediate to verify that c1 cannot be a
separating pair and, by the same argument, that c1 cannot attract borrowers adopting
j-project only. Hence, the only possible profitable deviations consist of contracts that
attract the entire pool of applicants and are either (A) pooling or (B) random.
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Consider (A). Then UL(c1) ≥ UL(cL∗) and UH(c1) ≥ UH(cH∗) and the pooling
contract c1 = (B1, R1) yields positive profits to the intermediary. Then, there exists ε > 0
such that the contract c1ε = (B1, R1 − ε) yields non negative profits to the intermediary
and UL(c1ε) > UL(cL∗). This contradicts the optimality of c∗.
Now consider (B). Then, c1 = (c1p, (c1L, c1H ), θ1) and:
• θ1pijs(c1p) + (1− θ1)pijs(c1j) ≥ pijs(cj∗), for j = L,H;
• c1p, c1L, and c1H yield nonnegative profits (with at lest one of them yielding positive
profits) to intermediary 1.
Evidently, it cannot be the case that either piLs (c1L) > piLs (cL∗) or piLs (c1L) = piLs (cL∗)
and c1L yields strictly positive profits, otherwise we reach a contradiction. Hence, we are
left with the following possibilities: either piLs (c1p) > piLs (cL∗), or piLs (c1p) = piLs (cL∗) and
c1p yields strictly positive profits. In the first instance the contradiction is immediate, in
the second we are back to case (A). Q.E.D.
Appendix 4: Collateral
In this appendix we show that the optimal contracts derived in our model would not
change under the assumption that entrepreneurs have some endowment and that lenders
were allowed to use this endowment to secure loans.
Suppose that each borrower s ∈ [0, 1] is endowed with a positive amount E of the
final good. Also, for logical consistency with our model, E can only be used as an input
in the production of materials. All other assumptions defining technologies and borrower
types are maintained. We now characterize contracts allowing for part of the borrowers’
endowment to be used to ”secure” the loan. More specifically, we consider a class of
contracts defined by the array (B,W, T, V ). Each of the components of the contract is
defined as follows:
• W ∈ [0, E] is the amount of the borrowers’ endowment invested in a secure deposit
yielding the opportunity cost of borrowing r.
• B ∈ [0, 1 −E −W ] is the loan size.
• T and V are, respectively, the payment by the borrower to the lender when the
project succeeds and the payment by the lender to the borrower when the project
fails. Since failure makes the borrower penniless, limited liability implies V ≥ 0.
For convenience, we define D = B−W and, from now on, a contract is characterized
with an array c = (D,W, T, V ). A borrower with contract c invests E +D in one of the
two projects. When the project succeeds, the borrower receives αj(E + D) + rW − T
and the lender receives T . When the project fails, the borrower receives V and the
lender receives rW − V . Evidently, by setting W = 0, T = RB and V = 0, we are
back to the loan contracts defined in section 4. We start the analysis by studying a
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separating contract cs = {(Bj ,W j , T j, V j), j = H,L}. The borrowers’ expected profits
from project j = H,L and contract i = H,L is:
pijs(ci) = α¯(E +Bi) + pj(rW i − T i) + (1− pj)V i − α¯ejs,
and the lenders’ non negative profit conditions now read:
pjT j + (1− pj)(rW j − V j) ≥ rBj (j = H,L),
Then, the optimal separating contract maximizes piL(cL) subject to the following con-
straints:
E +Bj ≤ 1, j = H,L, (CC)
piHs (cH) ≥ piHs (cL), (IC1)
piL(cL) ≥ piL(cH), (IC2)
V j ≥ 0, j = H,L, (LL)
pjT j ≥ rBj + pjrW j + (1− pj)V j, j = H,L, (ZPS)
where constraints (IC1) and (IC2) are s-invariant and take the following form:
α¯Bj + pj(rW j − T j) + (1− pj)V j ≥ α¯Bi + pj(rW i − T i) + (1− pj)V i,
for j 6= i and i, j = H,L.
It can be easily show that, at optimality, the lenders’ participation constraint (ZPS)
is binding. Hence, an optimal separating contract must solve the following programming
problem:
max α¯E + (α¯− r)BL s.t.:
E +Bj ≤ 1, (CC)
(α¯− r)BH ≥ (α¯− µr)BL + (1− µ)V L (IC1)
(α¯− r)BL ≥ (α¯− (1/µ)r)BH − (1/µ− 1)V H , (IC2)
where j = H,L. Using the standard arguments, it can be shown that (IC1) must be
binding, BH = 1−E and V L = 0. Hence,
BL(r) = α¯− r
α¯− µr
(1−E), λs(r) = (1− µ)r(α¯− r)
α¯− µr
(1−E).
Since the value of W (secured deposit) is unspecified, we can set W = 0 and claim
that the loan sizes (BL, BH) and the proportion of risky projects λ are the same as with
E = 0, except for the multiplicative factor (1−E). In particular, letting λs(r, E) be the
proportion of risky projects with an optimal separating contract, we get:
λs(r, E) = λs(r)(1−E).
Consider now the pooling case, cp = (D,W, T, V ). The profits to the borrowers are
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pijs(cp) = α¯(E +D) + pj(rW − T ) + (1− pj)V − α¯ejs
The lenders’ participation constraint now is:
(T + V − rW )
(
pL(1−G(λ)) + pHG(λ)
)
+ pL(1−G(λ)) + pHG(λ) ≥ rD + V.
Hence, λ = min{1, σ(T + V − rW )}.
When σ(T + V − rW ) ≥ 1, the contractual problem reduces to the maximization of
piH1 (cp) subject to the capacity and the lenders’ participation constraint. Since the latter
must be binding and λ = 1, we get: pH(rW − T ) + (1 − pH)V = −rD. By plugging
this equation into piH1 (cp), we get piH1 (cp) = α¯E + (α¯ − r)D − α¯e. In this case, we have
to maximize piH1 subject to the capacity constraint E +D ≤ 1 and the limited liability
constraint V ≥ 0. Evidently, the optimal pooling contract has D = 1 − E, whereas the
values of the remaining components T , V and W are irrelevant. By setting V =W = 0,
the lenders’ participation constraint becomes pHT = r(1 − E) = rD = rB, i.e., we are
back to the optimal pooling contract described in the text, except that the loan size is
now equal to 1−E.
Now consider the case σ(T + V − rW ) < 1. In this case, λ = σ(T + V − rW ). Ma-
nipulating the objective function and the relevant constraints, the search for an optimal
pooling contract can be reduced to the search of a solution to the following problem:
max{λ,V } T (λ)− rλ− (σ/pL)(α¯− r)V s.to: T (λ) ≤ (σα¯)/pL)[r(1−E) + V ],
T (λ) ≤ (σα¯)/pL)[r(1−E) + V ], (CC”)
where T (λ) = α¯[1 − (1 − µ)G(λ)]λ (as defined in appendix 1). The key observation is
that any solution of the above problem has V = 0. This is trivial when (CC”) is not
binding, since the objective function is non increasing in V , for r ≤ α¯. Now assume that
(CC”) is binding and define λV as the value of λ satisfying (CC”) with equality. Then,
piL(cp) = (σα¯/pL)r(1−E) + (σr/pL)V − rλV ,
∂λV /∂V = (σ/pL) (1− (1− µ)H(λV ))−1 ,
where H(λ) = G(λ) + λg(λ). Notice that (1− µ)H(λV ) < 1 because of the second order
conditions. It follows that
∂piL(cp)/∂V = −σr
pL
(1− µ)H(λV )
1− (1− µ)H(λV )
< 0.
Hence, we can set V = 0 and restate the optimality problem as:
max
λ
T (λ)− rλ s.t.: T (λ) ≤ (σrα¯/pL)(1 −E).
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The programming problem above is exactly problem (P.p′) (cf. appendix 1) other than
for the multiplicative factor (1−E) on the right hand side of equation (CC”). Here again,
the value of W is irrelevant for the specification of the contract and we can set W = 0
with no loss of generality.
Thus we can mimic the analysis already performed for the case E = 0. As before, we
denote by ξ1(r,E) the smallest value of λ which makes the lender participation constraint
binding. Evidently, ξ1(r,E) < ξ1(r, 0) = ξ1(r) and there exists a value rˆE ∈ (0, α¯) such
that Bp(r,E) = 1−E, and λp(r,E) = ξ1(r, E), for r ≤ rˆ(E), while (λp(r, E), Bp(r, E)) =
(λp(r, 0), Bp(r, 0)) = (λp(r), Bp(r), for r ≥ rˆ(E).Moreover, rˆ(1) = α¯, r(0) = rˆ (as defined
in appendix 1), rˆ(E) ∈ (rˆ(0), rˆ(1)) for E ∈ (0, 1) and rˆ(E) is increasing in E. The next
proposition clarifies the relation between the profit of the pooling contracts with and
without entrepreneurs endowments.
Proposition 14 piP (r,E) > α¯E + (1−E)piP (r), for E ∈ (0, 1) and r ∈ (0, α¯)
Proof. For r ≥ r(E), profits are
pip(r,E) = α¯E + pip(r, 0) = α¯E + pip(r).
For r ≤ r(E), Bp(r,E) = 1−E and, hence,
pip(r,E) = α¯E + α¯(1−E)− (pL/σ)ξ1(r, E).
Consider the interval (0, rˆ] ⊂ (0, rˆ(E)]. Then, since λp(r) = ξ1(r), r ∈ (0, rˆ), it suffices
to show that ξ1(r)(1 − E) > ξ1(r,E), which is verified if T (λ)(1 − E) < T ((1 − E)λ).
But this is equivalent to the condition (1−E)(1− µ)λ[G((1 −E)λ) −G(λ)] < 0, which
is surely verified.
For r ∈ [rˆ, rˆ(E)], it suffices to observe that T (η(r)) > T (ξ1(r, E)) = (1−E)(σrα¯/pL).
If η(r)(1 −E) ≤ ξ1(r,E), λ¯ = η(r)(1 −E) is feasible and
T (λ¯)− rλ¯ > (1−E)[T (η(r)) − η(r)r].
Otherwise, it follows from Bp(r,E) = (1−E) > (1−E)Bp(r) and η(r)(1−E) > ξ1(r, E).
Q.E.D.
For separating contracts, pis(r,E) = α¯E + (1 − E)pis(r), for r ∈ [0, α¯]. By the last
proposition, (pip(r,E) − pis(r,E))/(1 − E) > (pip(r) − pis(r)). Hence, we can state the
following
Proposition 15 Let U(E) be the collection of sub-intervals of [0, α¯] for which optimal
contracts are pooling. Then, U(E) 6= ∅ for all E ∈ [0, 1], U(1) = [0, α¯] and U(E) ⊃ U(E′)
whenever E > E′.
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For the uniform distribution G(s) = s, optimal contracts are always pooling for
E ≥ 1− e/4(1 − µ).
The analysis in this appendix shows that the introduction of borrowers’ endowment
E ∈ (0, 1) does not change the basic properties of the contracts studied for the case E = 0.
Chan and Thakor [8] study the optimal contracts between borrowers and lenders in a
model with both moral hazard and adverse selection, risk neutrality (of both borrowers
and lenders) and unconstrained access to a collateral good. The authors prove that,
when lenders maximize the borrowers’ rent, the optimal contract involves no rationing
of either type of borrowers and fully collateralized loans. Chan and Thakor study a
partial equilibrium model where collateral is a good that cannot be used for investment.
Applying this framework in our setting would require an additional storable good in
the economy. In any case, for credit rationing to be absent in an optimal contract, it
is crucial to assume that the borrowers’ access to the collateral good is unconstrained.
When firms have a limited amount of collateral and this amount is sufficiently low, credit
rationing can still arise. This shows that the result obtained by Chan and Takor is not
in contrast with our findings. In fact, we have rationing only if E < 1.
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